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A REMEDY FOR EMPLOYEES,
OR A SlliELD FOR EMPLOYERS?
Ruth C. Vance·

I. INTRODUCTION
Because of the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas hearings, the

Tailhook incident, and the attention that the media devoted to them_,
the public is now farniliar with tlie term "sexual harassment." Despite
fatniliarity with the term, many people remain uncertain about \Vhat
sexual harassment is. Actually, this offensive workplace activity had
1
no label until the mid-l970's. Sexual harassment was first defined in
the mid-1970's by feminist scholars as "unsolicited non-reciprocal
male behavior that asserts a wotnan's
sex role over her function as a
.
2
worker,', and as the "unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in
3
the context of a relationship of unequal power." With these sociological definitions of sexual harassment as a foundation, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (''EEOC") developed guidelines in
the mid-1980's that interpreted Title VIT's ban against sexual discrimination.4 Currently, according to those guidelines,
.

.

[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employ-

*

Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso Uriiver8ity School of Law.
I would like to give special thanks to Sue Collins for her editorial assistance. Thanks
also goes to my research assistants, Lynn Malkowski and ;Jim Kraayeveld, and to my
secretary, Bonnie Morrison.1. See LIN FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL HARAsSMENT OF WOMEN ON
nm JOB (1978).
2. Id. at 14, 15. Although this article could also apply to sexual harassment of men by
women, women by women.-and men by men, reference will be made to sexual harassment of
women by men because that is the most pervasive problem. See CA1HERINB A. MAcKINNoN,
SBXUAL HARAsSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN:

A CASB OF

SEX DISCRIMINATION

28 (1979).

3. MAcKINNON, supra note 2, at 1~
4. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.P.R. § 1604.11 (1991).
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ment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such
individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hQstile, or offensive working environment'

During the twenty years since sexual harassment was given that label,
society and the legal system have struggled to define it clearly and to
deal with it effectively. Most people now know that sexual harassment may occur as an isolated incident or as a continuing, pervasive
6
workplace condition. Additionally, most people understand that sexual harassment may be verbal or physical, and that it may range from
suggestive remarks and derogatory co1nments to direct demands for
sex, and from accidental unwanted touching to physical assault and
rape.' However, despite the increased attention from legal scholars
and the media, for most of us, lawyer and non-lawyer alike, the definition of sexual harassment rem.ains elusive.
Researchers have raised concerns that sexual harassment is an
economic issue as well as a personal and legal one. Recent studies
show that sexual harassment has negative consequences for individu8
als and businesses. Individuals who refuse to accept sexual harassment at work face verbal attacks, lack of cooperation by male coworkers, poor job evaluations, refusal of promotions, demotions, transfers, reassignment of shifts or hours, denial of job training, impossible
9
expectations, and tennination of employment. Victims of sexual harassment also endure high stress levels and may develop anxiety, high
10
blood pressure, headaches, and ulcers. Sexual harassment in the
federal workplace cost the govern1nent approxilnately $267 million
between 1985 and 1987 in the fonn of employee turnover, sick leave,
11
and reduced productivity. An average Fortune 500 company with
23,750 employees lost $6.7 million in 1988 because of absenteeism,
low productivity, and employee turnover connected with sexual ha-

s.

/tL

6. MAcKINNoN, supra note 2, at 2.
7. See FARLEY, supra note 1, at 15; MACKINNON, supra note 2, at 2; see also Krista
1. Schoenbeider, A Theory of Tort liability for Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U.
PA. L. REV. 1461-62 (1986).
8. Kate Stone Lombardi, Seeking to End SU.Ual Harassment, N:Y. 'nMBs, Aug. 23,
1992, at BWC6.

9. FARLEY, supra note 1, at IS.
10. Lombardi, supra note 8, at BWC6.
11. ItL (citing a 1987 study by the United States Merit Systems Protection Board).
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12

rassment.
The Hill-Thomas hearings have raised the consciousness of the
American public regarding sexual harassment and have galvanized
govern1:nent and business leaders to confront the issue. Since the
hearings, many sexual harassment victims have come forward, despite
13
the personal pain involved in making- a claim. Indeed, the nu1nber
of complaints filed with the EEOC during the first half of this year
14
was fifty percent higher than for the same _period last year. Quite
possibly, the Hill-Tho1nas hearings may have given the women who
15
were harassed by Navy personnel at the Tailhook convention the
courage to make their clai1ns. Additionally, the manner in which the
all-male Judiciary Comrnittee. conducted the Hill-Thomas hearings
prompted an increase in the number of women running for office
nationwide, giving rise to the 1992 election slogan "Year of the
16
Woman."
Because sexual harassment law is still in its infancy, predicting
how courts will apply the law to specific situations and detennining
what recourse victims have is difficult. Women received their first
federal statutory protections against sexual discrimination in the
17
workplace in the early 1960's from the Equal Pay Act and Title
18
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. However, the first reported
case of sexual harassment under Title VII was not decided until
19
1974. The United States Supreme Court's only case on sexual harassment was decided in 1986, twenty-two years after Congress enact20

ed Title VII.

21

Although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and state

12. ld. (citing a 1988 survey by WORKING -woMAN magazine).
13. Michelle Osborn, More Vi~tims Speak Out _After Anita Hill Charges, USA TODAY,
Aug. 3, 1992, at 4B.

14. ld.
IS. Taillwok Scandal Moves to Courtroom.
16~

,
SCI. MONITOR,

Sept. 10, 1992, at

Hilary MacKenzie, A Political Battle _o f the Sexes, MACLEAN's, Sept. 14, 1992, at

31.
17. 29 U. S.C. § 206(d) (1988). The Act states, in relevant part, that ''No employer •••
shall discriminate . • • between employees on the basis of sex [by paying unequal wages] for
equal work on jobs ••• which require equal skill,. effort, and responsibility ••••" ld.
18. 42 u.s.c. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1988).
19. Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123 (D.D.C~ Aug. 9, 1974).
20. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 51 (1986). As this article goes to press, the
Supreme Court issued its second opinion on sexual harassment, affirming the hostile _environment standard that it announced in Merltor. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367
(1993).
21. 42 u.s.c. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1988).
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22

civil rights statutes provide equitable remedies for victims of sexual
harassment, compensatory and punitive damages have not usually
23
been available. Last year, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of
24
1991 to amend Title vn to allow for such damages. However, employers with fewer than fifteen employees are exempt, and damage
25
caps exist for the employers who are covered. Therefore, this
a1nendment .may not provide adequate remedies to all victims.
Additionally, if the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of Title Vll is
followed, the statute may not be able to accomplish its purpose of
26
elitninating sexual harassment from the workplace. In Rabidue, the
court held that if the workplace was sexually hostile before the plaintiff beca1ne an employee, then the employer could not be held liable
27
for sexual harassment unless its level increased. The court reasoned
that Title vn was not enacted to change existing workplace condi28
tions. This type of interpretation of Title vn may cause some attorneys to bring actions under state civil rights acts. Although some
29
courts have criticized Rabidue~ attorneys may increasingly flle sexuSee; e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5·1 to 542 (West 1992).
23. Although most states do not provide compensatory and punitive damages; four states
do: California. Michigan. Minnesota, and Wisconsin. See infra note 63.
24. Civil Rights Act or 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended
at 42 u.s.c. § 1981 (1991)).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)(3). The Act states, in relevant part:
(3) Limitations. The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded
under this section for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and ·other nonpecuniary losses.
and the amount of punitive damages ·awarded under this section, shall not exceed,
for each complaining party(A) in the case of a respondent who bas more than 14 and fewer than 101
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding cal·
endar year, $50.000;
(B) in the case of a respondent who bas more than 100 and fewer than 201
,employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $100,000;
(C) in the case of -a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than 501
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the ctnTent or preceding calendar year. $200,000; and
(D) in the case of a respondent who, has more than 500 employees in each
of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $300.000.
I d.
Bills to eliminate the minimum number of employers and the caps on both compensatory and punitive damages have been introduced, but are languishing in committees. S. 17.
103d Cong.• 1st Sess. (1993); HJt 224, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
26. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1041 (1987).
27. ld. at 620-21.
28.. Id.
29. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1991); Andrews v. City of Philadel22~
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al harassment claims in state courts, fearing that federal judges, more

than one-half of whom have been appointed by a Republican administration, may take a conservative, pro-employer approach to resolving
this highly political issue.
As the law of sexual harassment evolves, attorneys have sought
to broaden victi1ns' means of redress by using traditional tort theories
30
in addition to statutory causes of action. Tort claims based on sexual harassment have some advantages that Title vn and sitnilar state
statutes do not. Plaintiffs suing under tort theories can file their
claims directly in court \Vithout first having to exhaust their adlninistrative remedies as claitnants under Title Vll must do. The typically
longer statute of limitations on tort actions provides a larger window
of opportunity to seek relief than does the 180-day deadline for filing
a clai1n with the EEOC. Attorneys may find that they have fewer
proof problems in bringing a tort clairn for clients whose relationships
began consentually than they have if they must prove that the sexual
harassment was unwelcome under Title vn. Even though the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 provides for compensatory and punitive damages,
tort clairns are still important to plaintiffs who are employed by employers with less than fifteen employees and to plaintiffs who face
caps on da1nages that will not allow full compensation. Furthermore,
the coverage of the 1991 Act is unclear as to sexual harassment that
31
occurred before its passage. However, the use of tort law to provide a remedy for sexual harassment has been accepted by some state
c.ourts and rejected by others.
This article begins by tracing the development of sexual harassment claims, both statutory and tort. This article continues by exploring how courts have used workers' compensation law to either allow
or bar tort claitns based on sexual harassment. This article then concludes that tort actions against employers based on sexual harassment

phia. 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990); Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345 (6th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110 (1989).
30. See generally Alice Montgomery, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A
Practioner's Guide to Tort Actions, 10 GoLDEN GATB U. L. REV. 879 (1980).
31. Leon Friedman, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Procedural Issues: Retroactivity,
Changes in Procedures for Attacking Consent Decrees and Seniority Systems; New Limitations
Periods, C742 ALI-ABA 159 (1992).
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari on two cases, which it bas consolidated, to
decide whether the Civil Rights Act of 1991 applies to cases pending on the Act's effective
date. Landgraf v. USI rtlm Prods., 968 F.2d 427 (Sth Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct.
1250 (1993); Harvis v. Roadway Express, Inc., 973 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted
sub nom. Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1250 (1993).
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should not be barred under the exclusive remedy provisions of
workers' compensation acts. The 1najor reason not to use workers'
compensation law to bar tort suits based on sexual harassment is that
workers' compensation laws do not take into account the strong pub..
lie policy against sexual harassment in the workplace and therefore
31
should not be allowed to render this policy ineffective. Neither
workers' compensation nor Title Vll was meant to address the indi33
vidual rights violated by acts of sexual harassment. Workers' compensation has as its policy the redressing of industrial injuries, and
34
the policy of Title Vll is to prevent group discri1nination. Therefore, tort suits are necessary to protect the sexual harassment victim's
individual rights.
The availability of tort suits to sexual harassment victims is not
uniform because of legislators' avoidance of the issue and because of
varying positions that the judiciary has taken as to its role in interpreting the workers' compensation statutes. Legislators have avoided
the issue because sexual harassment is a political hot potato. Any
legislative action to clarify workers' compensation acts as they apply
to sexual harassment will alienate either labor or management. Courts
that have barred tort suits based on sexual harassment under the exclusive remedy provision have stated that to rule otherwise would
usurp the legislature's function. On the other band, some courts have
found it easy to hold that sexual harassment is outside the scope of
workers' compensation and hence not governed by the exclusive
remedy rule. Despite the politically controversial nature of this issue,
state legislatures need to address it instead of leaving it to the courts.
The author of this article is not suggesting that employers should
be held strictly liable for sexual harassment if tort suits are allowed.
Even if the exclusive remedy provision is not used to bar tort actions,
the agency principles used to deter1nine employer liability limit the
frequency with which employers can be found liable for sexual harassment. In the final ·analysis, the most successful lawsuits against
employers are those for negligent hiring or retention because they do
not rely on agency principles. However, plaintiffs do deserve the
opportunity to try to prove their tort claims without the automatic
barrier of wol'kers' compensation. .

32. See discussion infra parts IV, V.
33. See infra pp. 150, 157.
34. See infra pp. 150, 158.
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American workers first obtained legal protection from sex dis36
crimination35 by accident. Sex discrimination was not included in
the original draft of Title VII of the proposed Civil Rights Act of
1964, but was added at the last minute in an effort to prevent pas37
sage of the Act. · Therefore, using legislative history to interpret the
sex discrimination portion of Title VII is problematic. Although Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sex, courts did not initially recognize a cause of
38
action for sexual harassment under Title VII. Judges did not want
to hold employers liable for the sexually harassing acts of their em39
ployees,. which the judges viewed as personal in nature. Courts
eventually included sexual harassment under the coverage of Title VII
by interpreting the language "terms and conditions of employment"
broadly.4()
In interpreting the language of Title VII, courts have recognized
two types of sexual harassment: quid pro quo and hostile environment. In quid pro quo sexual harassment, a supervisor conditions the
receipt of job benefits on the giving of sexual favors and retaliates if
41
the request is denied. Hostile environment sexual harassment exists

35. Ellen F. Paul, Sexual Harassme.nt as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 333 (1990) (tracing the legal developments of sexual harassment as
a type of sex discrimination).
36. William L. Woerner & Sharon L. Oswald, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A
View Through the Eyes of the Courts, 41 LAB. LJ. 786 (1990).
37. 110 CONG. REc. 2577-84 (1964).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(a)(l) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to lUre or discharge any individual, or othenvise to
discriminate against any -individual with respect_to compensation, tenns, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ••• sex ••••
See Garber v. Saxon Business Prod. Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977); Tomkins v. Public
Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.NJ. 1976) ("Sexual harassment and sexual·
ly motivated assault do not constitute sex discrimination under Title VIr') (emphasis in origi..
nat), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 P. Supp. 233, 236
(N.D. Cal. 1976) (holding that Title vn does not impose Uability for a supervisor's sexual
harassment), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Come v. Bausch &. Lomb, Inc., 390 F.
Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) (stating that it is "ludicrous to hold ·that the sort of activity
involved here [a supervisor's physical and sexual advances] was contemplated by the Act"),
vacated without op., 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
39. Paul, supra note 35, at 333.
40. Id. at 334.
41. ld.
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when supervisors or co-workers harass the victim to the point of
"unreasonably interfering with an individual's work or academic perfornlance or creating an intitnidating, hostile, or offensive working or
42
academic environment."
Initially, courts used the Title VII disparate treatment model to
recognize quid pro quo sexual harassment as a type of sexual discrimination.43 To have a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual
harassment, the plaintiff must show that the plaintiff is a member of
a protected class; that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; that the harassment was because of sex; that the harassment
affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and that the
44
employer is liable. Once the victim establishes a prima facie case
of quid pro quo sexual harassment, the employer may defend by
showing that it had a Iegiti1nate reason for its actions. The plaintiff
45
then may show that the reason was pretextual. To recover, a plaintiff must show that she suffered an economic hann from the harassment.46 The courts have adopted the EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, which place strict liability on employers for
47
quid pro quo sexual harassment by supervisors.
Reliance on a risk allocation theory is implicit in the courts'
holding an employer strictly liable for quid pro quo sexual harassment.48 The courts see employers as the most efficient risk avoiders
49
or risk insurers. They seek to eradicate sexual harassment by enforcing strict liability, creating an incentive for the employer to avoid
hiring and retaining sexist supervisors.so
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court held that hostile environment sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII as a fonn of
51
sex discrimination. The Supreme Court in Meritor adopted the
EEOC's Guidelines on Discrirnination Because of Sex as the Guide-

42. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.P.R. § 1604.11 (1991)
[hereinafter Guidelines].
43. Paul, supra note 35, at 338.
44. See Henson v. City of Dundee. 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11th Cir. 1982); see also
Marlisa Vinciguerra, The Aftennath of Meritor: A Search for Standards in the Law of Sexual
Harassment, 98 YALE LJ. 1717, 1721 (1989).
45. Hom v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 603 n.l (7th Cir. 1985)..
46. Paul. supra note 35, at 341.
47. Hom, 155 F.2d at 604; 29 C.P.R. § 1604.1l(e) (1984 Amendments).
48. Paul, supra note 35, at 354.

49. ld.
50. Id.; Hom, 155 F.2d 599.
51. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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52

lines relate to hostile environment. The hostile environment sexual
harassment action was modeled after racial hostile environ1nent actions.53 The Court found that a hostile environment exists under Title
VII \Vhen harassment reaches a level of severity or pervasiveness so
as "to alter conditions of employment and create an abusive working
54
environment." To present a prima facie case for hostile environment sexual harassment, the plaintiff must show that she is a member
of a protected group; that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual
harassment; that the harassment was based on sex; that the harassment
affected a "term, condition, or privilege of employment," and that the
employer kne\v or should have known of the harassment and failed to
55
take prompt remedial action. The Supreme Court in Meritor did not
make a definitive statement on employer liability for hostile environment sexual harassment cases, but suggested that lower courts use
56
traditional agency principles to make the determination.
The Restatement (Second) of Agency imposes liability on the
employer if the employee's act falls within the scope of employment.57 Factors that go into determining whether the employee acted
\Vithin the scope of his employment are the ti1ning and location of
the sexual harassment, whether it was authorized or foreseeable by
the employer, and whether it somehow furthered the employer's business.58 These agency principles incorporate an individual rights perspective regarding responsibility, delegation of responsibility, and
59
scope of employment. According to the individual rights theory,
people are free to choose but are responsible for the consequences of
60
making those choices. People are additionally responsible for the
61
consequences of acts delegated to others. The use of agency principles to detennine employer liability in hostile environment cases
makes recovery against an employer more difficult than in quid pro
quo cases.

52. Id. at 57; Guidelines, supra note 42, § 1604.
53. Paul, supra note 35, at 341 n.37.
54. Meritor, 411 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904
(11th Cir. 1982)).
SS. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
56. Meritor, 411 U.S. at 72; Paul, supra note 35, at 354.
57. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1957).
58. Yates v. AVCO Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 636 (6th Cir. 1987); Paul, supra note 35, at
354.
59. Paul, supra note 35, at 355.
60. Id.
61. ld.
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Before the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Title vn
remedies were limited to equitable relief such as back pay, injunc62
tions, and reinstatement. Some state employment discrimination
statutes that use Title vn as a pattern do provide sexual discrimina63
tion victi1ns with compensatory and punitive damages. Although the
pUrpose of Title vn was to remove sexual discrirnination from the
workplace with respect to compensation, tertns, conditions, or privi64
leges of employment, the lhnited remedies did not serve to deter
65
employers from allowing sexual discri1nination in the workplace.
Further, the lhnited remedies did not make sexual discrimination
66
victitns whole, which would also serve deterrent purposes.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 allows damages for victhns of
67
sexual discrimination. However, the monetary limits imposed on
these damages may prevent some victims from being made whole and
may mean that larger employers will not be deterred. Additionally,
those victi1ns who work for employers with fewer than fifteen employees are still unable to receive compensatory or punitive damages
68
under Title Vll.
Plaintiffs have added tort claitns to their Title Vll actions to
69
broaden their remedies. One comtnentator sees a tort action for
sexual harassment as having a purpose distinct from a Title vn action for sexual harassment because the tort focuses on the victim's
individual rights rather than on the societal problem of group discrim70
ination, which is the focus of Title Vll. These tort suits for sexual
harassment provide victims with additional avenues for recovery and
71
serve as an additional deterrent to employers. However, in many
states such clailns run right into a barrier imposed by the state's
72
workers' compensation act.

62. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-S(g) (1964).
63. Examples are California, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota.
64. See generally Ronald Turner, Employer Liability Under Title VII for Hostile Envl·
ronment Sexual Harassment by Supervisory Personnel: The Impact and Aftermath of Meritor
Savings Bank, 33 How. LJ. 1 (1990).
65. ld.
66. Id.
67. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991).
•
68. Id.
69. Paul, supra note 35, at 360-61.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. All states' workers' compensation acts provide that workers' compensation is the
exclusive remedy for work-related accidents. Many states find sexual harassment to be nn
accident arising out of and during the course of employment and apply the exclusive remedy
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SEXUAL

Tort actions for sexual harassment allow employees to redress
wrongs inflicted upon them individually and allow compensation for
all consequences flowing from the sexual harassment, including pain
73
and suffering, emotional da1nages, and general darnages. The purpose of a tort action based on sexual harassment is to redress the
individual's rights to privacy, freedom from sexual assault or the
threat of it, and freedom from the infliction of emotional distress.
Tort actions based on sexual harassment, which focus on individual
rights, supplement Title VTI actions, which focus on remedying group
discrimination by equalizing opportunities in the tnarketplace. Although a distinct tort of sexual harassment does not exist, the victhn
of sexual harassment 1nay rely on the torts of negligent hiring, negligent retention, intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault,
battery, invasion of privacy, intentional interference with a contractual
relationship, and fraud and deceit; these torts, with sexual harassment
74
as their basis, have been successfully 1naintained.
Under the theory of negligent hiring or retention, the employer
may be held liable for the acts an employee commits outside the
75
scope of employment. Most other causes of action against employers rely on agency principles, which require that the employee's tortious act be cotntnitted within the scope of employment. Thus, a suit
for negligent hiring or retention of an employee who sexually harassed a co-worker has a greater potential for success than some of
the other torts listed above because it avoids the employer defense
that the employee was acting outside the scope of employment and
therefore not furthering the employer's interests. To have a case for
negligent hiring or retention, the plaintiff must show that the harasser
was unfit, considering the nature of the job and the risk that the
employee posed to those who would foreseeably come into contact
\Vith hitn; that the employer knew, or should have known, of the
employee's unfitness; and that the employer's hiring or retention of
76
the unfit employee was the proxitnate cause of the injuries. The
rule to bar tort actions for sexual harassment
73. W. PAGB KEEToN, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEEToN ON nm LAW OF TORTS § 1 (5th
ed. 1984).
74. See Montgomery, supra note 30.
75. RONALD M. GREEN & RICHARD J. REIBSI"E£N, NEGUGENT HIRING, FRAUD, DEPAM'ATION, AND OI'HER EMERGING AREAs OF EMPLOYER LIABllJTY 7 (1988).
76. Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 340 S.E.2d 116, 123-24 (N.C. Ct App. 1986)
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hiring or retention of the employee is the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries if it is foreseeable that the plaintiff 111ight be
77
harmed by the employee. This cause of action is appropriate when
the plaintiff can show that the employer knew or should have known
that the harasser had a propensity toward, or a history of, sexual
misconduct.
Only recently have courts been allowing tort actions for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Historically, courts have
been reluctant to grant datnages for emotional distress unaccompanied
78
by physical impact. To recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the victi1n must prove actions so shocking and outrageous
that they exceed all bounds of decency so as to be intolerable in
79
civilized society. Cotninent E to the Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 46 indicates that abusive conduct by a supervisor who has
real or apparent authority over an employee or who has the power to
80
affect the worker's employment may be considered outrageous. A
supervisor or co-worker's conduct may also be deemed outrageous
when that person acts despite knowledge that an employee is particu81
larly susceptible to emotional distress. Sexually harassing conduct
should be regarded as outrageous per se under the Restatement definition.82 In fact, several jurisdictions have recognized actions for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress based on sexual harassment.83
Assault and battery have long been recognized as providing a

(holding the employer liable for sexual harassment if it knew of the co.emptoyee's tendency
to engage in such conduct).
77. /d.
78. Leslie Hertz Kawalar, Intentional Torts Under Workers' Compensation Statutes: A
Blessing or a Burden?, 12 HoFSTRA L. REv. 181, 184 (1983).
79. GREEN & REIBSTEIN, supra note 75, at 37; RBSrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
46(1) (1965).
80. Employer liability may be found where there is an "abuse by the actor of a position, or a relation with the other, which gives him actual or apparent authority over the
other, or power to affect his interests." REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmL e.
81. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cml f.
82. See Montgomery, supra note 30, at 894-95.
83. See, e.g., Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580 (Ariz. 1987) (allowing a sexually harassed employee to bring an intentional infliction of emotional distress suit because the
manager's and employer's conduct was not accidental in nature so as to limit the employee's
recovery to workers' compensation); Pikop v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 390 N.W.2d 743
(Minn. 1986) (rejecting the employer's defense based on the FELA provisions and finding
that, because there was a pattern of sexual harassment by her co-workers and supervisor, the
employer was liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress). cert. denied sub nom.
Burlington N. R.R. v. Gulati, 480 U.S. 957 (1987).
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84

remedy for unwanted touching of a sexual nature. Therefore, clairns
for assault and battery are commonly brought by victims of sexual
harassment.ss An assault claitn is proper where the employee reason86
ably fears unwanted sexual contact. A battery claim exists when the
87
unwanted sexual contact has occurred.
Less co1nrnon theories of tort liability for sexual harassment are
invasion of privacy, intentional interference with a contractual relationship, and fraud. Invasion of privacy arises when a person intentionally intrudes upon the privacy or private affairs of another person.88 Plaintiffs must show that the intrusion would be highly offen89
sive to a reasonable person. Defendants may avoid liability if they
90
prove that they had a legitimate reason to act.
A claim of intentional interference with a contractual relationship
may be appropriate where refusal to give in to sexual demands results
in retaliation such as termination, demotion, or loss of advancement,
91
training, or education. When a supervisor interferes with a contractual relationship through an illegal act such as physical violence or
92
fraud, a cause of action exists. In addition, a supervisor whose acts
of sexual harassment become so intolerable that an employee quits
may also be found to have interfered with a contractual relation-

84. Raefeldt v. Koenig, 140 N.W. 56 (Wis. 1913} (allowing battery suit for touching of
a sexual nature); · .
v. State, 60 Ga. 509 (1878) (allowing battery suit for touching of
a sexual nature)..
85. Davis v. United States Steel Corp., 779 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1985) (allowing claim of
assault and battery where supervisor's boss witnessed the supervisor touch the plaintifrs buttocks without her consent); Hart v. National Mortgage & Land Co., 235 Cal. Rptr. 68 (Ct.
App. 1987) (allowing claim of assault and battery where employee complained to his supervisors about sexual harassment by a male co-employee, and employer took no action);
Newsome v. Cooper-WISs, Inc., 347 S.E.2d 619 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (allowing claim for assault and battery where secretary was fired one month after she complained of unwanted
touching and rubbing by the comptroller).
86. Newsome, 341 S.B.2d at 621-22.
87. Id.
88. GREEN & REIBSTEIN, supra note 75, at 61; Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Servs.,

Inc., 711 F.2d 1524, 1532 (11th Cir. 1983) (allowing a claim for invasion of privacy where
employee's boss repeatedly asked her about her and her husband's sexual practices).
89. GREEN & REIBSFElN, supra note 75, at 61; Phillips, 711 F.2d at 1533.
90. GREBN & RBIBSI'BIN, supra note 75, at 61.
91. Montgomery, supra note 30, at 895; see REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
cmL d (1977) (listing factors relevant in determining whether a cause of action exists). See
also Favors v. Alco Mfg. Co., 367 S.E.2d 328 (Ga. Ct App. 1988) (existing genuine issue
of material fact precluded summary judgment on claim that foreman tortiously interfered with
worker's employment contract by setting in motion her termination because she would not
accede to his sexual requests).
92. Fifield Manor v. Fmston, 354 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Cal. 1960). See Montgomery, supra
note 30, at 896, 897.
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ship.93
Theoretically, an action for fraud could be based on sexual harassment. Perhaps claims for fraud .are not made because of difficulties in proof. To establish a cause of action for fraud, the plaintiff
must allege that the employer misrepresented material facts, either
through false representation, concealment, or non-disclosure; that the
employer knew of the misrepresentation's falsity; that the employer
intended to induce the plaintiff to rely on the misrepresentation; that
the plaintiff justifiably relied on the misrepresentation, and that the
94
plaintiff was datnaged because of the reliance. Most claims of fraud
regarding sexual harassment in the workplace would not be based on
any actual tnisrepresentation, but rather on an implied representation
of fair treatment and equal opportunity for all employees. A plaintiff
could argue that the employer impliedly represented that employees
would be evaluated according to the quality of their work and other
job-related factors. An employer breaches the implied representation
of equal opportunity in the workplace when sexual harassment is a
condition of employment. Another implied representation is that of a
95
safe workplace. The employer breaches the implied representation
of a safe workplace if the employer knew or should have kno\vn of
96
an employee's reputation for sexual harassment. Proof of these representations rnay exist in the employer's brochures, statements of fair
employment practices, OSHA notices posted at the workplace, and
97
employee handbooks. An employer Inight also be liable for fraud if
the employer knows that employees are subjected to sexual harassment by supervisors or co-workers and does not disclose this infor98
mation at the time of hiring.
Although prothlsing theoretically, the tort of fraud is difficult to
prove without actual misrepresentation. Even if actual misrepresentation exists, if it \Vas oral, fraud will be hard to prove.
Remedies provided by any of these tort actions supplement Title
VTI remedies to make the sexual harassment victim whole. But as
previously mentioned, many state courts never reach the merits of

93. Montgomery, supra note 30, at 897.
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OP TORTS §§ 525, 526, 551(1) (1976).
95. See Favors, 361 S.E.2d 328 (denying
judgment to the employer of a female who brought ~ claim against her employer for negligently failing to provide a
workplace free from sexual harassment because the employer should have known of the reputation of its foreman for sexual harassment).
96. ld.
97. Montgomery, supra note 30, at 903.
98. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OP TORTS § 551(1) (1976).
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these tort clai1ns because of the exclusivity of workers' compensation.99
IV.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION ST~I'UTBS AND CLAIMS
FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Workers' compensation is one of the oldest for1ns of social in100
surance in the United States. The rapid industrialization in this
nation at the tum of this century caused a dra1natic rise in workplace
101
injuries, diseases, and death. At that tirne, the cotn•non law provided that an employer was responsible for an employee's injury or
102
death only if the employer was negligent. The employer's common law defenses of contributory negligence, assu1nption of risk, and
negligent acts of fellow servants presented the injured employee with
103
often insurJnountable legal hurdles. Even after 1nany states enacted
laws establishing employer liability for workplace injuries and li1niting
104
an employer's use of co1n1non law defenses, injured workers still
had to establish employer responsibility and prove negligence to recover.105 Litigation was an uncertain, ti•ne-consuming, and costly
106
process for both the employee and employer.
In 1911, a form of no-fault insurance based on the statutory
scheme of compensation for personal injury and death "arising out of
107
and in the course of employment" emerged as a new concept.
This no-fault insurance was a swift, sure, and non-litigious system to
help the injured employee become self-sufficient by replacing lost
wages and paying medical expenses.
108
By 1920, all but eight states had enacted similar laws. Today,
each of the fifty states, American Sa1noa, Gua1n, Puerto Rico, and the

99.
100.
101.
102.

Montgomery, supra note 30, at 906.
1 ARTHUR LARsON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 4.00 (1990).
Id.

UNITED STATES Cfi:M.mBR OF COMMERCE, HISToRY OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION
AND EMPLOYERS' LIABR.I1'Y, 1989 ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS vii [hereinafter 1989 ANALYSIS].

103. ld.
104. 1 LARSON, supra note 100, §§ 5.20-.30.
lOS. Id. § 6.00.

106. See OFFICB OF FisCAL REviEw, INDIANA LBGISLATIVB SBRVICP.S AGENCY, 6 SUNSET
AUDIT ON INDUSTRIAL BOARD AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION SYSTEM 71-72 (1987) [hereinafter SUNSET AUDIT].
107. 1 LARSON, supra note 100, §§ 6.00-.60 (general discussion on the meaning of "arising out of the employment'').
108. Id. § 5.30.
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Virgin Islands have a workers' compensation system. Federal em110
ployees are covered by the Federal Employees Compensation Act,
while both private and public employees in nationwide maritime work
are covered by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa111
tion Act.
In theory, workers' compensation is really a compromise between
employers and employees. In the compromise, or quid pro quo
agreement, employers assume liability for certain occupational diseases, work-related injuries, and deaths, regardless of fault, in exchange for a monetary litnit on that liability and the surrender by
injured employees of any cotnmon law claitns against their employers.
In return for their surrender of con1mon law claims, making workers'
compensation the exclusive remedy, injured employees are guaranteed
112
monetary benefits regardless of fault Those benefits are not as
great as a lawsuit verdict might be, but they are certain. In economic
terms, workers' compensation laws make the economic losses of injury, death, and occupational disease a business cost that is ultimately
113
passed on to consu1ners.
In making the quid pro quo arrangement, state legislators intended to give financial assistance to employees whose injuries resulted
114
from workplace hazards and negligence. Legislators chose the language "arising out of and in the course of employment" to define
115
those workplace injuries. An employee's injury arises in the
course of employment if it occurs during the ti1ne and at the place of
employment while the employee is engaged in employment-related
116
activities. An employee's injury arises out of the employment if
there is a causal connection between a risk of the employment and
117
the employee's injury. These definitions serve as tests to ensure
that only workplace injuries are compensable under the workers'
•
compensation system.
109.. 1989 ANALYSIS, supra note 102, at vii.
110. ld.
111. ld.
112. OFFICB OF INSPECI'OR GENERAL, OFFICB OF AUDIT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
D..W.C.P. SHOULD EVALUATE NONFEDBRAL WORKERS' COMPENSATION TO AsSESS THmR
ADAPrABn.rrY TO FEI.A: AUDIT REPoRT NO. 02·6-037-09-435 (1988) [hereinafter AUDrr
REPoRT].

113.
25 AM.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Deborah A. Ballam, Intentional Torts in the Workplace: Expanding Employee Rights,
Bus. LJ. 63, 76-78 (1987) [hereinafter Ballam, Intentional Torts].
ld. at 74.
1 LARSON, supra note 100, § 1.00.
ld. § 14.00.
Id. § 6.00.
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Remedies are available only to workers whose compensable
118
injuries produce disability and affect earning power. Remedies
provided under workers' compensation statutes include disability and
impairment benefits to compensate for lost earnings and medical
benefits to restore the injured worker to an optimu111 level of
119
health. These remedies have the ultimate goal of returning the employee to gainful employment and a productive position in the community.120 Workers' compensation benefits, unlike tort judgments, are
not intended to make the injured worker whole, but to prevent the
121
injured worker from becoming a burden on the community. For
example, workers' compensation laws do not provide compensation
for pain and suffering. As an incentive for the worker to return to
gainful employment, wage-loss benefits are calculated by statutory
formulas that generally do not fully compensate the worker for actual
122
lost wages. Workers' compensation benefits are essentially a tran-,
sitional support system designed to provide support to injured workers
until they are rehabilitated and self-sufficient.
According to the quid pro quo arrangement, if a workplace injury is found to have arisen out of and in the course of employment,
workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for the injury, and the
123
employer is i•nmune from a suit based .on any other theory. An
employee who has a workplace injury that does not require medical
treatment or absence from work will not receive any benefits. Notwithstanding the lack of a rernedy under the workers' compensation
act, such an employee, in many jurisdictions, is barred from pursuing
legal action against the employer by the exclusive remedy provision
of the workers' compensation act.
Despite the purposes behind the enactment of workers' compensation statutes, many jurisdictions have found sexual harassment to be

118. Id. § 2.40; see also Kawalar, supra note 78, at 185.
119. 2 LARSON, supra note 100, §§ 57.10-.11.
120. Id. § 61.21.
121. ld. § 2.50; see also Kawalar, supra note 78, at 185.
122. Income or cash benefits payable under either temporary or permanent disability vary
significantly between jurisdictions. In many states, these benefits are based on a wage-loss replacement percentage. The majority of states use a payment formula that establishes maximum
weekly benefits in an amount that equals 66%% of that state's average weekly wage
(SAWW). 1989 ANALYSIS, supra note 102, at 18-20 (Chart VI); see also AUDIT REPoRT,
supra note 112.
123. 2A LARsoN, supra note 100, § 65.11; see also Deborah A. Ballam, The- Workers'
Compensation Exclusivity Doctrine: A Threat to Workers' Rights Under State Employment
Discrimination Statutes, 21 AM. Bus.. LJ. 95, lOS (1989) [hereinafter Ballam, The En:lusivity
Doctrine].
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124

a compensable workplace injury. Many states that find sexual harassment to be compensable under workers' compensation acts have
denied tort actions based on sexual. harassment because of the exclu125
sive remedy provision. This denial of a. tort action to sexual harassment victims usually leaves the employee without a remedy because most sexual harassment victims have negligible or no medical
126
expenses and no lost wages. The lack of a suitable remedy for
sexual harassment under workers' compensation acts may indicate that
workers' compensation never had as its goal the coverage of sexual
harassment.
The goal of fair employment laws such as Title VTI, to ''guaran127
tee equal opportunity in the marketplace," is vastly different from
the goal of workers' compensation statutes, "to redress industrial
128
injuries." Providing remedies for sexual harassment is in line with
the goal of fair employment laws such as Title VII. It is less clear
that providing workers' compensation coverage for sexual harassment
on the job fulfills the goal of redressing industrial injuries. Indeed,
one might ask whether sexual harassment is an industrial injury. Sexual harassment, an injury occasioned by intentional actions in the
workplace, is not a nor1nal risk of employment. No support can be
found in early case law for the position that intentional torts were
129
considered a nonna1 risk of employment. The Supreme Court has
found that Congress intended Title VII to "supplement, rather than
supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment discrimination."130 According to the Supreme Court's ruling, Title VII
should supplement tort actions that would provide remedies for sexual
131
harassment. Therefore, the exclusive remedy provision of workers'
compensation statutes should not operate to prevent tort actions that
would complement Title VTI.
.

124. See Lapinad v. Pacific OldsmobUe-GMC Inc., 67') F. Supp. 991 (D. Haw. 1988);
Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580 (Ariz. 1987); Hart v. National Mortgage and I.and Co.,
235 Cal. Rptr. 68, (CL App. 1987); Millison v. B.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 501 A.2d
SOS (NJ. 1985); Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 340 S.E.2d 116 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986);
Palmer v. Bi-Mart Co., 758 P.2d 888 (Or. Ct. App. 1988).
125. See cases cited supra note 124.
126. See cases cited supra note 124.
127. Ballam, The Exclusivity Doctrine, supra note 123, at 98 n.12 (citing Freeman v.
Kelvinator, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 999, 1000 (B.D. Mich. 1979)).
128,. Id.
129~ Ballam, Intentional Torts, supra note 113, at 78.
130. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 4849 (1974); see Ballam, The Ex·
clusivity Doctrine, supra note 123, at 120.
131. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 47, 48.
'
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V. WORKERS' COMPENSATION EXCLUSIVE RE:MEDY DEFENSE

All state workers; compensation systems provide that workers'
compensation is the exclusive remedy for employees' injuries as the
quid pro quo for employers' acceptance of liability regardless of fault.
The scope of the protection from com1non law tort suits afforded
employers through the exclusive remedy provision is unclear, as the
amount of litigation involving the exclusive remedy defense indicates.132 Implicit in the workers' compensation scheme is the notion
that coverage is provided for the inevitable employee injuries caused
by negligence or other nortnal hazards of employment. No evidence
indicates that the legislatures intended the employer to be protected
from financial ruin arising from workplace injuries caused by something other than negligence, or a normal hazard or risk of employ133
ment. Nevertheless, the exclusive remedy provision offers great
protection to employers because most courts and state legislatures
have interpreted the exclusive remedy provision broadly and have
134
created fe\v exceptions. Some state legislatures have even reacted
to judicially created exceptions by passing legislation that narrows
135
those exceptions.
The broad interpretation courts have given the exclusive remedy
provision has left some injured employees without a remedy where
their \Vork-related injury does not diminish their wage-earning capacity. A worker in California incurred work-related injuries resulting in
136
sexual impotence. The worker argued that the exclusive remedy
provision should not bar his tort suit, because his physical disability
137
was not compensable under the workers' compensation scheme.
138
The California appellate court, like many other state courts, ruled
that \vorkers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for work-related

132. Arthur Larson devotes a 171-page chapter of his treatise to the exclusivity provision.
2A LARsoN, supra note 100, §§ 65.00-67.00.
133. See Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems., 433 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 857 (1982) (holding that the public policy behind workers' compensation does not
allow employers to protect themselves from liability due to intentional torts).
134. Ballam, The Exclusivity Doctrine, supra note 123, at 106; see generally 2A LARSON,
supra note 100, §§ 65.()(M)7.00.
135. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(A) (Anderson 1986) (overruling Blankenship);
\V. VA. CODB § 23-4-2 (1985) (overruling Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907
~v. Va. 1.978)).
136. \Villiams v. State Compensation Ins. Funct 123 Cal. Rptr. 812 (Ct. App. 1975).
137~ Id. at 815.
138. See 2A LARsoN, supra note 100. § 65.20 and cases cited therein.
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injuries even if the resulting disability is not compensable. In its
reasoning, the court pointed to the historic tradeoffs made by the employer and employee,- and_ stated ~at when the employee received
protection for loss of earning capacity without fault, he surrendered

his comnton law right to damages, even those unrelated to earning
140
capacity., This reasoning has likewise been applied to tort claims
141
based on sexual harassment. An Indiana worker who received no
workers' compensation benefits when she was sexually harassed on
the job was barred from bringing a tort suit because the court ruled
that workers' compensation provided her with her exclusive remedy
142
even though she received no benefits.
The tradeoff that the California appellate court presumed
benefits to protect eanling capacity in return for _giving up the right
to sue at com1non law for damages, even those unrelated to eanung
143
capacity
is out of balance. When state legislatures passed the
workers' compensation schemes, a more equivalent trade \Vas likely
intended. Indeed, some c_ourts do interpret the quid pro quo to exclude from the exclusive remedy provision -any work-related injuries
144
that are not compensable. Specifically, in sexual harassment cases,
some courts have created an exception to the exclusive remedy rule
for the non-disabling emotional injury brought about by sexual ha145
rassment.
Some state legislatures have tempered the harshness of the exclusive remedy provision with another statutory provision that provides
for a percentage increase in the injured worker's award when the
injury results from the employer's "serious and wilful misconduct."146 Courts in states with these penalty statutes face the dilemma of trying to determine whether the legislature intended the penalty
to take the place of an exception to the exclusive remedy rule_that
147
would allow a common law suit. In enacting a penalty provision,
139.
140.
141.
19.89).
142.
143.

Williams, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
ld.

Fields v. Cummins Employees Fed. Ctedit Union, 540 N.E.2d 631 (Ind.

Ct~

App.

Itl. at 637.
Williams, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 8l5.
144~ 2A LARsoN, supra note 100, §§ 68.30-.36.
145. See infra_note 152; see also 2A LARsoN, supra note 100, § 68.34(a).
146. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 4SS3 (West 1989); MAss. GBN. LAws ANN. ch. 152, §
28 (\Vest 1988); 1&. RBv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306 § S (West 1967 & Supp. 1992);_see
2A LARsoN, supra note 100, § 69~10.
147. E.g., Jobns·Manville Prods. Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 612 P.2d 948
(Cal. 1980); Renteria -v. County of Orange, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
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a state legislature may have been trying to motivate employers to provide a safe workplace rather than intending to abrogate the
148
employee's right to bring a cotntnon law action. Nevertheless, the
California appellate court pointed out one shortcotning of such a
penalty provision when it stated that "[w]here there is no compensable injury, 50 percent of nothing is still nothing, and Labor Code
149
section 4553 cannot function as a deterrent."
Despite courts' and legislatures' broad interpretation of the exclusive remedy provision, a few exceptions have been recognized. Exwhen the employer acts in a dual
ceptions have been reco ·
150
capacity toward the employee, when the workers' compensation
151
act is preempted by a federal act, when the injury is essentially
152
non-physical, and when the employer commits an intentional
153
tort. Dual capacity and preemption arguments have resulted in few
exceptions. Cases involving non-physical injury or intentional torts, on
the other hand, have prompted many courts to create exceptions to
the exclusive remedy rule and will be discussed in detail in the following two sections.
Under the dual capacity or dual persona doctrine, an employer
may be liable in tort if the employer possesses a second persona or
relationship with the employee that i1nposes obligations entirely indep·endent from those obligations related to the. status as an employer.154 The theory behind the dual capacity doctrine is that in the
quid pro quo agreement, the employee only gave up all rights against
155
the employer acting as an employer, but reserved any other rights.
The dual capacity doctrine became popular in Ohio and California, especially in products liability cases. In an Ohio case, a truck

148. 2A LARsoN, suprQ note 100, § 70.10.
149. Renteria, 147 Cal. Rptt. at 452. Contra Genson v. Bofors-Lakeway, Inc., 332
N.W.2d 507 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that tort action for damage to bladder was
barred even though the damage was not specifically compensable under workers' compensa•
tion).

150. See, e.g., Douglas v. B. & J. Gallo Wmery, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (CL App. 1977),
infra note ISS.
151. See, e.g., Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990), infra notes 167-68 and
•
accompanymg text.
152. See, e.g., Uvitsanos v. Superior Court, 828 P.2d 1195 (Cal. 1992); infra note 2SS
and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Gulden v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 890 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1989), infra
note 174.
154. 2A LARSON. supra note 100, § 72.81.
155. See Bell v. Industrial Vangas, Inc., 637 P.2d 266 (Cal. 1981), for the historical
development of the dual capacity doctrine in California.
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driver was injured by a blowout of a tire that had been manufactured
156
by his employer. The court held that the employer had a second
capacity as a manufacturer and thus could be held liable for manu157
facturing a defective tire. The Califonlia appellate court recognized
the dual capacity doctrine in a products liability case similar to the
158
Ohio case.
The California legislature and the Ohio Supreme Court ended the
use of the dual capacity doctrine after subsequent cases had expanded
159
application o.f the rule. In California, the legislature eliminated the
160
dual capacity doctrine in a 1982 amendment to its labor code. · In
Ohio, the supreme court narrowed the dual capacity doctrine by sub161
stituting the term "dual persona.u In the Ohio case, a police officer riding a motorcycle was injured when he drove over a hole in the
162
street. The court did not allow his lawsuit against the city because
it found that the employer was not acting in a second capacity that
created obligations to the employee, independent of its obligations as
161
an employer. The court held that any second capacity must be so
164
independent that it creates a separate legal persona. The court reasoned that because the streets were the ·police officer's place of employment, maintaining a safe workplace was not an independent obli1
gation of the police officer's employer. 6S Fear of destroying employer itnmunity by the expansion of the dual capacity doctrine to
include the employer in capacities such as landowner, land occupier,
manufacturer, modifier of equipment, vender, vehicle O\vnert and
156. Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 361 N.E.2d 492 (Ohio Ct App. 1977).
157. ld.
158. Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery. 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (Ct. App. 1977) (allowing an
employee to successfully sue his employer when he was mjured from a fall due to the col·
lapse of an elevator scaffolding device that was manufactured by the employer).
159. California: D'Angona v. County of Los Angeles, 613 P.2d 238 (Cal. 1980) (extending doctrine to perntit suits against the employer for medical treatment furnished under compensation law); Bell v. Industrial Vangas, Inc., 637 P.2d 266 (Cal. 1981) (applying doctrine
to employers who assemble a product for their employees' us~ and occasional sale to others).
Ohio: Guy v. Arthur H. Thomas Co.., 378 N.B.2d 488 (Ohio 1978) (extending doctrine to
permit a suit against the employer for medical treatment furnished under the compensation
law); Walker v. Mid-States Teraninal, Inc., 477 N.B.2d 1160 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (holding
employer liable as a matter of law in its dual capacity as a manufacturer of a hoist even
though the hoist used in the accident was different from the personal elevators that the employer manufactured for commercial sale).
160. CAL. LAB. CODB § 3602 (West 1989).
161. Freese v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 445 N.E.2d 1110 (Ohio 1983).
162.. Id.
163. ld. at 1114, 1116.
164. ld.
165. Id. at 1116.
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health services provider has caused other jurisdictions either to refuse
to recognize the dual capacity doctrine or to recognize only the nar166
rower dual persona doctrine. The rejection of the dual capacity
doctrine .is an exarnple of the broad interpretation. given the exclu-sive
remedy provision, which keeps employers largely i1nrnune from suit
for obligations that they may have toward the employee outside the
employment ·relationship.
The United States Supreme Court bas ruled that the exclusivity
provision is not so broad as to preempt the federal Migrant and Sea167
sonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act. In Adams Fruit Co.,
migrant farm workers who were injured in Florida while being transported in. the employer's van sued the employer under the federal
Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, alleging
that their injuries occurred because of their employer's intentional
violations of the Act's motor vehicle safety provisions. The Court
held that the Act preempts state law in that it does not pertnit the
68
state to supplant the Act's remedial scheme with its own!
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court cited a Florida case
in which the court had refused to apply the exclusivity rule to bar a
169
tort action based on sexual harassment in the workplace. In the
sexual harassment case, the Florida Supreme Court had refused to
apply the role in an extratenitorial manner that would, in effect, have
derogated the policies of federal and state laws against sexual harassment.rto The Supreme Court in Adams Fruit Co. agreed with the
Florida Supreme Court's decision not to allow the exclusivity rule to
limit federal remedies or to create a conflict between the policies of
171
federal and state legislation. Interpreting the exclusive remedy provision so expansively that it denies tort actions based on sexual harassment in the workplace thwarts the strong federal and state public
policies against sexual discrilnination and harassment that occur in the
workplace. Therefore, using the reasoning of the Supreme Court in
'

'

'

166. 2A LARsoN, supra note 100, §§ 72.81 and 72.83 lists Dlinois, Kentucky, Massachu• setts, Michigan. Minnesota, Missouri, North Dako~ Ohio, Wisconsin, and Florida as recog•
nizing the narrower dual persona doctrine. The majority of states hold that an employer who
manufactures, modifies, instaUs, OJ:" distributes_a product used in work cannot be held liable
under products liability. See 2A LARsON, supra note 100, § 72. 83 n.21 for cases.
167. Adams Fruit Co. v. Bmett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990).
168. ld. at 649.
169. Id. at 647 (citing Byrd v. Ricbardson.Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099, 1102
(Fla._1989)).
170. Byrd v. Ricbardson.Qreensbields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099, 1102 (Fla. 1989).
171. Adams, 494 U.S. at 647.
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Adams Fruit Co. and the Florida Supreme· Court in Byrd, the exclusive remedy provision should not be applied to· deprive sexually harassed workers of their rights under state tort law.
The most widely recognized exception to the exclusive remedy
provision allows a comtnon law action when the employer conunits
172
an intentional tort. The intentional tort exception may be a creature of statute or com•non law. The focus of statutes penalizing an
employer's intentional misconduct range from the imposition of a
penalty added to the workers' compensation benefits to the permitting
173
of a com1non law suit. Jurisdictions vary as to the level of intent
necessary to warrant an exception to the exclusive remedy provision.
Some state courts have refused to use the exclusivity provision to bar
174
intentional tort actions against employers. Several states have used
the intentional tort exception to the exclusive remedy provision to
115
allow tort actions for sexual harassment in the workplace~ while
other states have refused to recognize an exception and bar those
176
sarne tort actions.
Courts have. relied on public policy in carving out exceptions to
the exclusive remedy rule so that workers may pursue damages for
intentional torts. In their decisions, courts have struggled to define the
lirnits of workers' compensation coverage. Too broad an interpretation
.
of the quid pro quo agreement allows workers' compensation systems
to pre-empt other possible statutory and common law remedies, based
on equally important policies, that otherwise would be available to
.

'

172. For a discussion of the trend to allow common law actions for intentional torts see
Kawalar. supra note 78.
173. The following are examples of states that per1nit a common law action jf the em·
ployer had an actual intent to produce the injury that occurred: ARIZ. RBV•. STAT. ANN. §
23·1022 (1983 & Supp. 1991) (common law· suit allowed); CAL. LAB. CODB § 4553 (West
1989); MAsS·. GEN.. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 28 (West 1988) (100% penalty); OR. RBV. STAT.
§ 656.156 (1991); WASH. REv•. CODB ANN. § 51.24.020 (West 1990).
174. Gulden v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.• 890 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding under
Oregon law that an employer who ordered employees to clean up a PCB spill without protective clothing may have intended that the employees be injured, and therefore denying the
employer summary judgment); Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 558 So. 2d 93 (Fla.
Dist.. Ct. App.. 1990) (holding that suit alleging that employer diverted smoke stack so that
fumes went into workplace not barred); Kennedy v. Panino, SSS So. 2d 993 (La. Ct. App.
1989) (holding that suit for intentional batteries by employer not barted).
175. Lapinad v.. Pacific Oldsmobile-GMC, Inc~, 679 F. Supp. 991 (D. Haw. 1988); Ford
v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580 (Ariz. 1987); Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 340 S.B~2d
116 (N.C~ Ct. App. 1986); Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 515 N.E.2d 428 (Ohio 1991); Pursell
v. Pizza Inn, Inc., 786 P.2d 716 (OkltL Ct. App. 1990).
176. Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 789 F.2d 540 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying Wisconsin
law); Fields v.
Employees Fed. Credit Union. 540 N.E.2d 631 (Ind. Ct. ,App.
1989); Baker v. Wendy's of Mont., Inc., 687 P.2d 885 (Wyo. 1984).
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employees. Many courts have decided that the policy of providing
economic certainty to employers and employees should not be so
pervasive that it makes the tort law goal of redressing wrongs inflict177
ed upon injured parties inoperable. These courts have made exceptions to the exclusivity provision in cases of inadequate compensation

benefits, total non-availability of benefits, and lack of an effective
deterrefit against the employer, especially when these are accompanied
178
by intentional acts of the employer.

VI. THE

ONAL TORT EXCBPriON TO 'fHB
EXCLUSIVE
Y RULE

The most egregious intentional tortious conduct occurs when the
actor intends the injurious consequences of an act. At the other end
of the continuu1n of tortious conduct is ordinary negligence, which

consists of a mere risk that a certain consequence will follow. Tort
scholars generally agree that a person who intentionally acts knowing
that certain results are substantially certain to follow also conunits an
179
intentional tort, albeit not the most egregious type. Most jurisdictions have decided that the exclusivity provision was never intended
to be used by employers as a shield from liability for intentional

177. WD.l.IAM PROSSER., LAW OF TORTS at 2 (4th ed. 1971).
178. Raden v. City of Azusa, 158 Cal. Rptr. 689 (Ct. App. 1979) (allowing a civil action
for retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim on the grounds that workers' compensation did not "adequately protect'' the worker); Meyer v. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, Local 63A, 63-B, 151 Cal. Rptr. 597 (Ct. App. 1979) (allowing a sexual harassment suit for assaul~
battery, false imprisonment. and rape, holding that workers' compensation was not the exclusive remedy for assaults committed by the employer's agents); Renteria v. County of Orange,
147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Ct. App. 1978) (holding that the exclusivity provision did not bar an
intentional infliction of emotional distress cJaim based on racial discrimination); see Montgomery, supra note 30, at 910.
179. "[l]ntent is broader than a desire • • • to bring about physical results. It extends not
only to those consequences which are desired, but also to those which the actor believes are
substantially certain to follow from what the actor does.'~ W. PAGE KlmroN BT AL., PRossna
AND KlmroN ON 11m LAW OF TORTS § 8, at 35 (5th ed. 1984); "As the probability
that • • • [a certain] consequence will follow decreases, and becomes less than substantially
certain. the actor's conduct loses the character of intent. and becomes mere recklessness • • • • As the probability decreases further, and amounts only to a risk that the result
will follow, it becomes ordinary negligence • • • ." RFS'I"ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § SA
cmt. b (1965); ''Lying between intent to do b~ which • • • includes proceeding with
knowledge that the ba1m is substantially certain to occur, and the mere unreasonable risk of
hann to another involved in ordinary negligence, there is a penumbra of what bas been
4
called 'quasi-intent.' To this area. the words wilful,' 'wanton.' or 'reckless.' are customarily
applied; and sometimes, in a single sentence, all three." KlmroN, supra note 73. § 34, at 212
(fooblotes omitted).
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180

torts, but conflict exists as to the definition of intentional tort.
Courts that allow suits for intentional torts against employers
181
despite the exclusive remedy rule have used three theories. First,
courts have reasoned that an intentional injury cannot be an accident,
182
and therefore workers' compensation coverage was never intended.
Second, courts have reasoned that intentional torts are not a normal
risk of the workplace; therefore, the injury does not arise out of the
employment relationship and does not meet the test for compensability.183 Finally, courts have also found that, at the ti1ne of the intentional tort, the employment relationship is severed, and again, the
184
injury does not meet the compensability test.
Jurisdictions draw the line at different p.oints on the continuum
of tortious conduct in deciding whether to allow intentional tort
clai1ns for work-related injuries. To support an intentional tort claim
for a work-related injury, some jurisdictions require a specific intent
185
to injure, while others require only that the employer's misconduct
186
187
be wilful and wanton. Most states, either by statute or case
law, allow employees to bring suits for intentional torts if the employee can prove that the employer specifically intended to injure the
188
employee, as in the case of assaults. Actions for intentional torts
180. Renteria v. County of Orange, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447, 452 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that
the exclusivity provision did not bar a tort claim based on racial discrimination); Jablonski v.
Multack, 380 N.E.2d 924 (Dl. App. Ct. 1978) (preventing an employee who was assaulted by
a co-employee to recover under workers' compensation law because the co--employee was not
acting as an alter ego for the employer, stating that workers' compensation law must avoid
shielding the wrongdoer from liability and reasoning that the legislature would not permit the
intentional tortfeasor to shift his liability to a fund paid for with premiums collected from
innocent employers); Copelin v. Reed Tool Co., 596 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (interpreting the state constitution. stating that the legislature does not have the power to deny a
cidzen the right to resort to the courts for the redress of any intentional injury because that
right is constitutionally protected).
181. 2A LARsON, supra note 100, § 68.11.
182. ld.
183. ld.
184. ld.
185. Lusk v. Monaco Motor Homes, Inc., 775 P.2d 891 (Or. Ct. App. 1989): see 2A
LARsoN. supra note 100, § 68.13 and cases cited therein.
186. Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.B.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978) (allowing exception
for tort claims in cases of knowingly maintaining an unsafe workplace in violation of a stat·
ute or regulation, despite a 1983 amendment to West Virginia's Workmens' Compensation
Act that overruled the Mandolidis definition of "delibemte intention" as Wilf'ul and reckless
misconduct); see W. VA. CODB § 23-4-2 (1985); see also Mayles v. Shoney's, Inc., 405
S.E.2d 15 (W. Va. 1990) (allowing employee's tort suit for burns under 1983 amendment
because of a high risk of harm and violation of safety regulations).
187. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.. § 23-1022 (1984); MD. ANN. CODB art. 101, § 44 (1979);
OR. REv. STAT. § 656.156 (1983); WASH. RBv. CODB § 51.24.020 (1984).
188. 2A LARsON, supra note 100, § 68.11. See Gulden v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 890
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such as false imprisonment, defa1nation, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress have also been allowed, but usually specific intent
189
to injure the employee is necessary. Although a fe\v states have
broadened the scope of the intentional tort exceptio~ to include inju190
ries that are substantially certain to ocqur, Arthur. Larson suggests
that the exception to the exclusive remedy rule cannot be stretched to
include the employer's wanton, wi1ful, reckless, or malicious negligence because these acts do not rise to the level of a specific intent
to cause injury, which is necessary for the injury to lose its acciden191
tal, and hence compensable, character. This reasoning is flawed,
ho\vever, because one can hardly say that a worker's injury \Vas acci. .
dental when it was caused by the employer's wanton, wilful, or reckless conduct.
Some courts have categorically refused to recognize any intentional act exception to the exclusive remedy rule, no matter what the
192
employer's conduct. Other courts have either not decided the

F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding specific intent may be found where workers were ordered
to clean up a PCB spill without protective clothing); Van Biene v. ERA Helicop~rs, Inc.,
779 P.2d 315 (Alaska 1989) (holding a knowing violation of FAA regulations did not constitute specific intent); Briggs v. Pymm Thermometer Corp., 537 N.Y.S.2d 553 (App. Div.
1989) (concealing dangers fraudulently did not constitute specific intent); Lusk, 775 P.2d at
895 (failing to supply a supplied-air respirator to worker using hazardous spray paints did not
constitute specific intent to injure).
189. 2A LARsON, supra note 100, § 68.11.
190. Mayer v. Valentine Sugars, Inc., 444 So. 2d 618 (La. 1984) (allowing action for
injuries occurring in an explosion and fire because it was substantially certain to occur when
employer violated safety regulations); VerBouwens v. Hamm Wood Prods., 334 N~W.2d 874
(S.D. 1983) (finding that although it was probable that the employee's injury resulted from
the design of the employer-manufactured saw, it was not substantially certain).
191. 2A LARsON, supra note 100, § 68.00.
192. Buford v. AT & T, 881 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no intentional act exception to the Indiana Occupational Disease Act's exclusivity provi~ion where
worker was exposed to benzene); Cox v. American Aggregates Corp., 580 N.B.2d 679 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1991) (finding no intentional tort where a welder welded in a poorly ventilated area
with rods that emitted manganese and chromium fumes, which are known to cause lung
damage; the plaintiff did not present evidence showing that dle employer intended to injure
him, and the employer's conduct was at most grossly negligent or wanton): National Can
Corp. v. Jovanovich, 503 N.E.2d. 1224 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (though baning the injured
worker's intentional tort action for failure to prove that the employer had the specific intent
to hann the worker, the court stated that "it would be a tQtal perversion of the humanitarian
purposes
of the Act to peunit an employer to use the Act as a shelter against liability for an
.
intentional tort"); Rajala v. Doresky, 661 P.2d 1251 (Kan. 1983) (finding no exception for an
intentional tort, the court stated that the exclusive remedy rule is valid even when the employer conduct is intentionally tortious or culpably negligent, or when the plaintiff is left
without a remedy); Barber v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., SSS A.2d 766 (Pa. 1989) (holding
that even if the injured workers could prove that the employers exposed the workers to asbestos dust knowing that it would cause disease, the Occupational Disease Act would still
.
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question of whether to create an intentional tort exception to the
exclusive remedy provision, or have not found a set of facts strong
enough to support finding that an employer specifically intended to
193
injure an employee.
Courts that have broadened the intentional tort exception have
done so by refening to the doctrine of "constructive intent" from the
94
Restatement (Second) of Torts} West Virginia ,and Ohio were two
195
of the first states to broaden the intentional tort exception. In
96
Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc.! the West Virginia Supreme
Court interpreted its statute to allow a lawsuit for "wilful, wanton,
provide the exclusive remedy); Poyser v. Newman & Co., Inc., 522 A.2d 548, SS0-51 (Pa.
1987) (holding that the Pennsylvania Workmens' Compensation Act bars an injured
employee's 'intentional tort claim); Parker v. Energy Dev. Co., 691 P.2d 981 (Wyo. 1984)
(holding that the exclusive remedy rule is absolute and covers even intentional and culpably
negligent employer conduct); Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., 687 P.2d 885 (Wyo. 1984)
(following this absolute rule to del)y a sexual harassment, suit).
In Buford, the Seventh Citcuit bel~ based on workers' compensation cases, that no
intentional act exception exists to the Indiana Occupational Disease Act's exclusivity provi·
sian. Buford, 881 F.2d at 436. However, the court did recognize the possibility that the Indiana Court of Appeals may find exceptions where the employer has specific intent to injure,
or where a violent crime has been committed. ld. at 434 (citing National Can Corp. v.
Jovanovich, 503 N.B~2d 1224 (Ind. Ct App. 1987) and House v. D.P.D., Inc., 519 N.B.2d
1274 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988)).. Despite the dicta of these cases, the Iildiana Court of Appeals
for the Third District refused to find physical sexual assault an intentional act sufficient to
overcome the exclusive remedy rule~ Arrow Unifonn Rental, Inc. v. Suter, S4S N.B.2d 832
(Ind. Ct. App. 1989). On the other hand. the Indiana Court of Appeals for the FJJ"St District
relied on the National Can dicta to allow a tort suit based on racial harassment. Perry v.
Stitzer Buick, GMC, Inc., 604 N.B.2d 613 {IJ1d. CL App. 1992). To clarify seemingly conflicting decisions, the question of whether Indiana recognizes an intentional ,tort exception has
been ,certified to the Indiana Supreme Court by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana. Baker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., No. 49-S-009309 CQ-1004
(Ind. Sept. 9, 1993).
193. National Can Corp., 503 N.E.2d at 1233-34 (fmding evidence insufficient to show
that employer specifically intended employee's injury when it refused to assign employee to
light duty work after he injured his back).
194. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states:
Intent is no~ however, limited to consequences which are desired. If the actor
knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his
act and still goes ahead, he is treated by the Jaw as if he bad in fact desired to,
produce the result. As the probability that the consequences will follow decreases
and becomes less than substantial certainty. the actor's conduct loses the character
of intent, and becomes mete recklessness • • • •
RFSI'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § SA (1965); see, e.g., Woodson y. Rowland, 407 S.E.2d
222 (N.C. 1991).
.

.

195. Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc~, 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978) (superseded by
statute as stated in Handley v. Union Carbide Corp., 804 F.2d 265 (4th Cit. 1986)):
Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Cbem., Inc., 433 N.B.2d 572 (Ohio), cert. denied, 459
u.s. 857 (1982).
196. 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va.. 1978).
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197

and reckless misconduct." The court stated that employers will be
found liable if they act with an appreciation of the great risk of phys198
ical harm they have created. The legislature overruled Mandolidis
in 1983 when it modified the supreme court's definition of deliberate
intent by outlining requirements for a tort action that would allow
such an action only in aggravated cases of knowingly maintaining
unsafe workplaces and in cases where the employer has violated
199
statutes or regulations.
In Blankenship,Z» the Ohio Supreme Court looked to the Ohio

Constitution, which establishes the workers' compensation system, to
the Act's exclusive remedy provision, and to public policy to determine that employers should not be allowed to escape liability for
201
their intentional torts. In interpreting the constitutional provision
that requires liberal construction of the Act to provide broad coverage
along with the Act's exclusive remedy provision, the court decided
that the legislature intended to limit employer imrnunity to claims
202
based on compensable injuries. The court then determined that one
of the purposes of the Act is to protect employers from tort actions
based on negligence, but that protecting employers from liability for
intentional torts would undermine the Act's additional purpose of
203
promoting a safe workplace. The court also stated that the Act "is
founded upon the principle of insurance," but that the insurance principle does not include shielding employers from liability for their
intentional torts.~ In a subsequent case, the Ohio Supreme Court
defined an intentional tort as not requiring a specific intent to injure,
but requiring only knowledge that harm is a substantially certain
205
consequence of the employer's act.
In 1986, the Ohio legislature narrowed the court's definition of
206
intentional tort. The statute allows suits for intentional torts and
defines an intentional tort as an act committed with the belief that the
197. Id. at 914.
198. ld.
199. W. VA. CODB § 234-2 (1985).
200. 433 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio 1982).
201. Id. at 575-77.

202.
203.
204.
205.

ld. at 577.
Id.

Id.
Jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 472 N.E.2d 1046, 1051 (Ohio 1984) "The actor must know
or believe that harm is a substantially certain consequence of his act before intent to injure
will be inferred. The existence of this knowledge or intent Qn the part of the actor may be
inferred from his conduct and surrounding circumstances.;" ld.
206. OHIO REv. CODB ANN. § 4121.80(B) (Anderson 1986)~

•
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2117

injury is substantially certain to occur, but the definition of "substantially certain" states that the employer has to act \Vith "deliberate
208
intent'' to cause an employee to suffer an injury. By defining substantial certainty as "deliberate intent," the legislature, in effect, eliminated the substantial certainty test and returned to a specific intent
•
requtrement.
The West Virginia and Ohio legislatures most likely enacted the
more restrictive statutes out of a fear that a weakened exclusive remedy doctrine would fail to protect employers from financial ruin from
209
large judgments, a major objective of the quid pro quo. Although
judicial decisions in Michigan, Ohio, and West Virginia adopting
either the wilful and wanton misconduct or substantial certainty standard have been modified by statute, the modifications only narrow the
210
application of the judicially set standards rather than abolish them.
Indeed, Michigan, Ohio, and West Virginia courts have each allowed
intentional tort suits in cases where there was substantial certainty of
harm since the legislatures passed their a1nendments to the workers'
211
compensation acts. These recent cases indicate a trend toward recognizing the substantial certainty rule.
Professor Larson is concerned that a broad defmition of inten212
tional tort will erode the no-fault basis of workers' compensation.
He begins with the premise that because one of the purposes of the
workers' compensation system was to mini1nize litigation, all pre13
sumptions should be against allowing lawsuits} In deciding ho\V

207. Omo RBv.. CODB ANN. § 4121.80(0)(1) (Anderson 1986).
208. ld.
209. See Ballam, The Exclusivity Doctrine, supra note 123, at 112, 113,
210. MICH. COMP. LAws § 418.131 (Supp. 1990); 41 Omo RBv. CODB ANN. § 4121.80
(Anderson 1986); W. VA. CODB § 23-4-2 (1985).
211. Adams v. Shepherd Prods., U.S., Inc., 468 N.W.2d 332 (Mich. a. App. 1991) (al·
lowing an intentional tort claim to an employee who lost three fingers while operating a
circular saw from which the blade guard had been removed, where the employer allegedly
wilfully disregarded the certainty of harm); Fyffe v. Jeno's, Inc., 570 N.E.2d 1108 (Ohio
1991) {denying the employer's motion for summary judgtllent. holding that it was possible for
a, jw:y to find that there was a "substantial certainty, that injury would result when safety
guards were removed from a conveyer belt); Mayles v. Shoney's, Inc•• 405 S.B.2d lS (W.
Va. 1990) (allowing a restaurant employee who was burned by a container of bot grease to
collect damages in an intentional tort suit because the court found that there was a high risk
of haun and that safety regulations had been violated); accord Woodson v. Rowland, 407
S.B.2d 222 (N.C. 1991) (allowing an intentional tort claim where an employee was killed in
a trench cave-in, adopting the substantial certainty rule, and finding that such misconduct is
tantamount to an intentional tort).
212. 2A LARsoN, supra note 100. § 68.15(e).
213. ld.
.

.

.
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intentional torts should fit into the quid pro quo balance, Larson

states that "unjust" results under the workers' compensation system
214
are normal. For exatnple, employees who negligently injure them215
selves get benefits. He believes that an intentional tort should be
allowed only if the employer specifically intended the injury, because
that is the only situation where the injury would be non-accidental.216 In addition, Professor Larson suggests that specific intent provides the only bright line rule that would be the least intrusive in
211
administering workers' compensation laws.
Allowing intentional tort actions under either the specific intent
to injure standard or the substantial certainty standard does not undennine the tradeoffs of the quid pro quo agreement. Granted, one of
the purposes of enacting workers' compensation acts was to aninimize
218
litigation. However, it does not follow that lawsuits should be disallowed at all costs. The no-fault basis of workers' compensation that
Larson speaks of is a no-fault system only in ter1ns of negligent conduct on the part of both employers and employees. Intentional nlisconduct, determined under either the specific intent or the substantial
certainty standard, is not part of the quid pro quo, as evidenced by
state statutes that disallow benefits in cases of employee wilful Inisconduct. Likewise, most states that have addressed the issue allow
219
actions against employers for intentional torts. Actions should be
allowed not only when the employer specifically intends the injury,
but also when an employer's intentional misconduct is substantially
certain to result in injury, because such misconduct retains the character of intent and amounts to more than mere recklessness. Moreover,
employers should not be able to hide behind the shield of the exclusive remedy provision merely to preserve a convenient, bright-line
test.

Larson's characterization of benefits awarded to workers who
negligently injure themselves as an "unjust'' result is flawed because
this type of result was intended by the legislators who enacted
workers' compensation systems. Truly unjust results that were not
considered in the quid pro quo, which throw it out of balance if
included, such as an employer avoiding liability for conduct that is

214.
215..
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id.
/d.
ld.
Id.
See 2A LARsoN, supra note 100, § -68.1S(e).
Id. § 68.15.
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substantially certain or specifically intended to cause injury, should
not be accepted as "nor1nal." Furthennore, allowing tort actions in
cases of intentional wrongs motivates employers to provide a safe
workplace, an additional purpose of workers' compensation systems,
and prevents them from using the exclusive remedy provision as a
shield against liability.
Allowing tort suits in cases of sexual harassment, cases that
involve intentional rather than negligent acts, does not undermine the
quid pro quo, because intentional acts were not a part of the quid pro
quo. In fact, courts have allowed tort suits based on sexual harassment using both the specific intent and substantial certainty standards.220 In Ford v. Revlon, Inc., the Arizona Supreme Court used
the substantial certainty standard to allow an employee to bring an
intentional tort claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress
221
against her employer. In Ford, despite numerous contacts with
Revlon management, the plaintiff was unable to get Revlon to take
any action on her complaints of sexual harassment until one year
221
after making the first complaint. The court classified Revlon's
223
conduct as extreme or outrageous and found that even though
Revlon may not have intended to cause the plaintiffs emotional distress, Revlon's failure to take remedial action made it a near certainty
224
that the plaintiffs emotional distress would occur.
Oregon's workers' compensation statute contains a provision that
allows an intentional tort action where the employer has a specific
intent to injure the employee. In Palmer v. Bi-Mart Co., the plaintiff

220. Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580. 586 (Ariz. 1987) (relying on intentional nature
of the corporation's failure to take action when the employee complained of sexual harassment by the manager in allowing the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress);
O'Connell v. Chasdi, 511 N.E.2d 349, 351-52 (Mass. 1987) (allowing an action against a coemployee, fmding sexual harassment to be an intentional tort unrelated to the interests of the
employer); Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 340 S.E.2d 116, 120 (N.C. Ct App. 1986)
(allowing a tort claim against the employer based on sexual harassment, stating that the
Workers' Compensation Act does not bar a l'lwsuit against the employer for the employer's
intentional conduct); accord Brown v. Burlington Indus., 378 S.B.2d 232 (N.C. Ct. App.
1989); Pursell v. Pizza Inn. Inc., 786 P.2d 716, 717 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990) (allowing a tort
action based on sexual harassment, finding that the workers' compensation statutes were not
meant to shield employers ftom ''willful. intentional or even violent conduct,.); Palmer v. BiMart Co., 758 P.2d 888, 891-92 (Or. Ct App. 1988) (finding an employer's failure to stop
continuous harassment after being made aware of it sufficient for the Jury to fmd that the
employer specifically intended to produce the injury).
221. Ford, 734 P.2d at 585.
222. /d. at 582-83.
223. /d. at 585.
224. [d.
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complained of her supervisor's sexually harassing conduct for six
215
months before the employer attempted to remedy the situation.
The Oregon Court of Appeals found those facts sufficient to support
226
an inference that her supervisor bad a specific intent to harm her,
227
and a tort action was allowed.
The intentional tort exception, although \videly recognized, is
controversial in terms of the choice of standard and its application.
As discussed above, both the specific intent test and the substantial
certainty test have been used to allow tort suits in similar cases of
sexual harassment. The degree of intent problem can be avoided by
more properly analyzing on-the-job sexual harassment as being out228
side the scope of the workers' compensation system. Workers'
compensation schemes were enacted to compensate workers for inju229
ries that result from a nor1nal risk of the employment. Workers do
not expect sexual harassment to be a normal risk of the employment.
Therefore, the exclusive remedy provision of the quid pro quo agreement should not apply to 'bar the sexually harassed employee.
Allowing employee tort claims based on sexual harassment because sexual harassment falls- outside the workers' compensation
scheme also permits actions based on negligence. For example, the
Ohio Supreme Court found the legislature's narrow substantial certainty standard inapplicable in a case where the plaintiff alleged that
the employer
"intentionally
or
negligently
maintained
a
policy
of
.
230
encouraging, permitting, or condoning sexual harassment.'' In allowing the tort action, the court held that in light of Ohio's public
policy against sexual harassment on the job, forcing victitns of
workplace sexual harassment to meet a strict intent test in order to
sue the employer when the workers' compensation system fails to
provide a true remedy for sexual harassment contravenes the public
231
policy against sexual harassment.
In su1n, sexual harassment is an intentional act, and as such can
provide the basis for an exception to the exclusive remedy rule., Torts
based on sexual harassment have been allowed under both the specific
225. Palmer v. Bi~Mart Co, 758 P.2d 888, 889·90 (Or. Ct. App. 1988).
226. ld. at 891.
227. It! at 892.
228. See Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 587, 589-90 (Ariz. 1987) (Feldman,, J.,
concurring).
229. See 1 LARSON, supra note 100, § 6.00; see also Hart v. National Mortgage & l.and
Co., 235 Cal. Rptr. 68, 73 (Ct. App. 1987).
230. Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 575 N.E.2d 428, 430 (Ohio 1991).
231. IlL at 435.
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intent and substantial certainty standards, but the whole problem of
the degree of intent can be avoided by focusing on the core issue of
compensability. Sexual harassment is not an accident and is not a
normal risk of employment; hence, sexual harassment is outside the
scope of the workers' compensation system. Furthermore, the lack of
a meaningful remedy for sexual harassment within the workers' com~
pensation system points to the necessity of allowing tort actions so as
not to thwart the public policy against sexual harassment.
Vll. THE NATURE

OF 1'HR INJURY AND WORKERS'

COMPENSATION COVERAGE

Another factor courts have used to detennine whether to allow a
tort suit is the nature of the injury. Courts have recognized the exclusive remedy defense to a tort clairn only if the nature of the injury is
232
such that it is covered under the act. Traditionally, if the injury is
non-physical, then there is no compensation coverage and a tort suit
233
is allowed. Non-physical injuries that may give rise to tort actions
such as invasion of privacy, fraud, deceit, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress do not come within the basic coverage criteria of
214
"personal injury by accident."
Focusing on the nature of the work-related injury in deciding
whether to allow a tort action has led to anomalous results. The California courts have dealt with this issue in a series of cases. In 1978,

232. 2A LARsoN, supra note 100. § 65.40.
233. ld.
234. ld. § 68.30; Hamilton v. East Ohio Gas Co., 351 N.B.2d 775 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973)
(stating that finding an intentional tort to be an ''injury" is difficult because of the accidental
quality of the term "injury'' in a suit against a woman's employeJ' and co-employees for false
imprisonment, invasion of privacy, slander, and intentional infliction of emotional distress).
Arthur t .arson supports the physical versus non-physical harm distinction and states,
[l]f the essence of the tort • • • is non·physical, and if the injuries are of the
usual non-p}lysical sort, with physical injury being at most added to the list of
injuries as a makeweight, the suit should not be barred. But if the essence of the
action is recovecy for physical injury or death • • • the action should be barred
even if it can be cast in the fonn of a nonnally non·physical tort.
2A LARsON, supra note 100, § 68.34(a).
Professor I...arson's statement would seem to support allowing tort actions based on
sexual harassment because sexual harassment does not normally result in significant physical
injury. However, Professor Larson's approach would probably bar tort suits based on sexual
harassment that result in physical injury, both under the nature-of-the-injury test and under his
bright line specific intent standard for allowing intentional tort exceptions. Using these tests
would create the potential for greater recovery to those who sustain solely psychological
damage.
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the California Court of Appeals allowed a tort action for a county
235
employee \vho alleged intentional racial harassment. In Renteria v.
County of Orange, the plaintiff brought a clahn for intentional inflic~
tion of emotional distress that did not result in a disabling physical
136
injury. The court distinguished this case from a non-compensable,
non-disabling physical injury, such as impotence, which is non-com231
pensable only because it does not affect wage-earning capacity.
The court held that the intentional harassment was in a "class of civil
\vrongs outside the contemplation of the workers' compensation system."238 The court further reasoned that a civil suit had to be allo\ved to provide the employee with a remedy and the employer with
239
a deterrent.
In 1987, the California Supreme Court distinguished Renteria and
barred a plaintiff's action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.240 In Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection District, a firefighter,
who was subjected to continual harassment by the assistant chief,
241
developed hypertension and eventually had a disabling stroke. In
barring his tort action, the court stated that if the tort clai1n had not
been allo\ved in Renteria, the plaintiff would not have had a reme241
dy. The court found that the firefighter had a physical disability
243
that was compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act. The
court refused to find an intentional tort exception to the exclusivity
rule, stating that evaluations and personnel decisions were inherently
intentional, a normal risk of employment, and therefore covered under
244
the Workers' Compensation Act. The court did not adopt the rul~
ing in Renteria that intentional harassment belonged to a ''class of
civil \vrongs outside the contemplation of the workers' compensation
245
system." The court used the nature-of-the-injury test even though
it recognized the possibility that an employee who has suffered emotional distress without a resulting physical injury could recover damages, \vhile an employee who has suffered a physical injury in com.

'

. .

235. Renteria v. County of Orange, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Ct. App. 1978).
236. ld. at 451.

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id.
ld.
Id. at 451-52.

Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist, 729 P.2d 743, 747 (Cal. 1987).
Id. at 744.
I d. at 747. 748.
243. Id. at 744, 750.
244. ld. at 750.
245. Id. at 747.
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bination with emotional distress, which is usually a more reprehensi246
ble injury, would be limited to workers' compensation benefits.
Two months after the California Supreme Court used the natureof-the-injury test in Cole, the California Court of Appeals decided to
abandon the test when it allowed an employee, who alleged both
physical and mental injuries, to bring a suit for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, negligent retention, and assault and battery
247
based on homosexual harassment. The appellate court pointed out
the anomalous results that can occur under the nature-of-the-injury
248
test that the Cole court had recognized. The court also discussed
the difficulty of separating physical and mental damages, and the
249
difficulty of deciding which one is dominant at the pre-trial stage.
250
The court replaced the physical versus non-physical harm distinction with inquiries as to whether the acts were a "nonnal part of the
251
employment relationship" or were "incidents of the employment
252
relationship." These factors were also used by the Supreme Court
253
in Cole. Professor Larson states that if a court abandons the na~
ture-of-the-injury test, workers' compensation will become a less
254
exclusive remedy as the seriousness of the injuries increases.
However, abandoning the nature-of-the-injury test may be necessary to
avoid anomalous results. In fact, distinguishing between physical and
non-physical injuries is contrary to the purpose of workers' compensation to provide benefits for reduced wage-eanling capacity. To
achieve results that are internally consistent and consistent with the
p-urpose of workers' compensation, the inquiry must be focused on
public policy and the inherent risks of employment.
Recently, the California Supreme Court reconciled the courts'
255
analysis in Renteria and Cole. While agreeing with the result that

246. ld.
247. Hart v. National Mortgage & Land Co., 235 Cal. Rptr. 68, 73 (Ct. App. 1987).
248. ld. at 73, 74.
249. ld. at 73.
250. In Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 885 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit
followed the nat'UnW>f-the-injury test enunciated in Cole. The court stated that the court of
appeals in Hart was powerless to abandon the supreme court's test and substitute the "normal
part of the employment relationship" test.
251. Hart, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 73 (citing Cole v. Fair Oaks Fll'e Protection Dist., 729 P.2d
743, 750 (Cal. 1987)).
252. Hart. 235 Cal. Rptr. at 73 {citing Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Court,
612 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1980)).
253. Cole, 129 P.2d at 750, 751.
254. 2A LARsoN, supra note 100) § 68.34(d).
255. Livitsanos v. Superior Court, 828 P.2d 1195 (Cal. 1992).
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the court of appeals reached in Renteria, the supreme court suggested
that the court of appeals erred in stating that emotional injury that
256
results in \Vork-related disability is not compensable. The supreme
court would not tolerate the anomalous results guaranteed by using
the nature-of-the-injury test and found that regardless of whether an
injury is physical or non-physical, the injury is compensable if it
257
affects wage-earning capacity. The supreme court added that if the
employer's conduct contravenes funda1nental public policy or exceeds
the inherent risks of employment, then workers' compensation will
258
not be the exclusive remedy.
Focusing on the nature of the work-related injury has also led to
conflicting results in sexual harassment cases. A civilian Army em9
ployee brought a lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claitns Acf-5 for
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from
261
260
sexual harassment. She did not clain1 any physical injuries. In
allowing the tort suit, the Ninth Circuit held that the Federal Employee Compensation Act, which provides workers' compensation to fed~
eral employees, compensates government employees for physical
262
injury only. Presu1nably, a tort suit alleging physical ha•n1 would
be barred.

Florida Court of Appeals cases decided the same day barred
assault, battery, negligent hiring and retention, and intentional inflic263
tion of emotional distress claims based on sexual harassment. Both
cases involved a battery of unwanted touching that resulted in mental
264
injury. In each decision, the court interpreted the statutory definition of "accident," which states that "mental or nervous injury due to
T\VO

stress, fright or excitement only . . . shall be deemed not to be an
265
injury by accident arising out of the employment."
The court
found that the emotional distress claim in each case was not "due to
266
fright or excitement only," but was caused by a battery. In

256. Id. at 1202.
257. Id. at 1201-02.
258. Id. at 1202.
259. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
260. Sheehan v. United States, 896 F.2d 1168 (9th Cir. 1990).
261.. ld. at 1169.
262. ld. at 1174.
263. Schwartz v. Zippy Mart, Inc., 470 So. 2d 720 (Fla. Ct. App. 1985); Brown v.
Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 469 So. 2d 155 (Fla. Ct App. 1985). These cases were subse-

quently
264.
265.
266.

Qverroled in Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1989).
Schwartz, 470 So. 2d at 721; Brown, 469 So. 2d at 158.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.02(1) (West 1991).
Brown, 469 So. 2d at 158; Schwartz, 470 So. 2d at 722.
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Schwartz, the court added that the touchings were more than technical
267

batteries. Even the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
268
in Brown was barred. The court stated that the label placed on the
tort was irrelevant because all the tort claims were based on the im269
pennissible touching. The fact that the Workers' Compensation
Act provided the plaintiffs with no remedy was irrelevant to the
270
court. As Judge Ervin's partial dissent points out, if the sexual
harassment had been accomplished without physical contact, then the
conduct would not have been covered by the Workers' Compensation
271
Act, and the common law suit would not have been barred.
Whether the physicaVnon-physical distinction is made regarding the
manner of sexual harassment or regarding the type of injury caused
by sexual harassment, making such a distinction leads to inconsistent
decisions on the allowance of tort suits.
In sexual harassment cases, most courts have not relied on the
physical versus non-physical injury distinction, but have looked to
incidents or risks of the employment and defmitions of terms such as
"accident," "arising out of," and "in the course of' to detertnine
272
whether to allo\v a tort action. Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court
relied on the broader public policy against sexual harassment in overruling Schwartz and Brown and finding that sexual harassment \Vas
273
not meant to be covered by the Workers' Compensation Act. In
Byrd, the Florida Supreme Court distinguished the battery involved in
sexual harassment cases from that in other cases and found that battery in sexual harassment cases usually does not involve lost \Vages
274
or physical injury, but rather unlawful disregard of personal rights.
275
In the concurring opinion, Judge Grimes quoted Larson and stated
that it was important to focus on whether the physical injury produced was the kind covered by the Workers' Compensation Act, and
not automatically bar a tort action based on the mere allegation of a

267. Schwartz, 470 So. 2d at 722.
268. Brown, 469 So. 2d at 159.
269. Id.
270. Id.; Schwartz, 410 So. 2d at 723.
271. Brown, 469 So. 2d at 161 (Ervin, 1., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
272. See, e.g., Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099, 1100.01 (Fla.
1989); Brown, 469 So. 2d at 158.
273. Byrd, 552 So. 2d at 1102 (Fla. 1989).
274. ld. at 1104 n.8.
275. ld. at 1105 (Grimes, J., concurring and quoting Arthur Larson). See 2A LARSON,
supra note 100, § 68.34(a).
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276

battery.
Florida is not alone in its difficulties regarding the compensability of non-physical, mental injuries; jurisdictions differ as to the compensability of mental injuries, depending on what caused the mental
injury. Claims involving mental injuries fall into three categories: 1) a
physical injury resulting from a mental stimulus, such as a stressinduced heart attack; 2) a mental injury caused by a physical stimulus, such as depression caused by the loss of a limb; and 3) a mental
injury resulting from a mental stirnulus, such as post-traumatic stress
277
disorder caused by witnessing a co-employee's death. Most jurisdictions have no difficulty finding injuries in the first two categories
compensable because the causation is easier to assess when the injury
278
is accompanied by a physical itnpact or manifestation. In the third
category, the jurisdictions do not agree. States, such as Florida, that
279
do not compensate mental-mental clairns point to the difficulty of
proving that the work caused the mental injury and to the speculative
nature of mental injury as being incapable of measurement by any
280
legal standard. Other states are willing to grant workers' compensation to mental-mental claims despite the difficulty in formulating
legal tests to prove that the work caused the injury; courts in these
states find that the proof problems do not justify the denial of
281
claims.
..
When the mental stimulus in a mental-mental claim is sudden or
traumatic, courts are more likely to award benefits because such a
mental stimulus, like a physical stimulus, can be pinpointed to a
particular time and place. In cases of gradual or cumulative mental
282
stimuli, three tests have emerged to detertnine work-connectedness.
Under the unusual stress test, a mental injury is compensable if the
mental injury was caused by exposure to "unexpected, unusual, or
extraordinary" stress greater than that experienced by the average

276. Byrd, 552 So. 2d at 1105 (Grimes, J., concurring).
277. These categories are commonly referred to as mental-physical, physical-mental, and
mental-mental. See DONALD T. DECARLO & MARTIN M!NKOWITZ, WORKERS' COMPENSATION
INSURANCE AND LAW PRACI1CB: THE NEXT GENERATION 229 (1989). See generally 1B
LARsON, supra note 100, § 42.20-.23.
278. 1B LARSON, supra note 100, § 42.23; David D. Thamann, Employee Mental Dis·
ability Claims and Insurance, 17 N. KY. L. REv. 391, 393 (1990).
279. City of Holmes Beach v. Grace, 598 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1992).
280. Thamann, supra note 278, at 393.
281. ld. at 393-94.
282. See generally Glenn M. Troost, Comment, Workers' Compensation and Gradual
Stress in the Workplace, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 847 (1985).
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283

employee. A claimant in jurisdictions that use the second test, the
objective causation test, need only establish a causal connection be284
tween the workplace and the mental injury to receive benefits.
The objective causation test is a two-part test. First, the claimant must
285
prove that the stressful job conditions actually exist. Second, the
claiinant must prove that employment conditions contributed more to
the cause of the mental disorder than did non-employment conditions.286 The third test, the subjective causal-nexus test, is rarely
used because of its tendency to compensate mental injuries with the
287
slimmest possible work connection. Under the subjective causalnexus test, compensation will be granted to a claimant whose subjec288
tive and honest impression is that the claimant is disabled.
The objective causation test best meets the objective of workers'
289
compensation schemes to cover all genuinely work-related injuries.
Jurisdictions relying on the unusual stress test probably do so in the
290
belief that the unusualness will make causation easier to prove.
But the unusual stress test does not support the workers' compensation goal of broad coverage because it results in the denial of benefits
291
to claimants who are predisposed to mental injury. Notwithstanding the difficulty of proving the causation of mental injuries, the
trend is toward recognizing that mental injury caused by stress is
similar to physical injury caused by stress because no true distinction
292
can be made between the two. The trend toward recognizing men293
tal-mental claims has led to more of those claims being ftled. One
cotnmentator posits that workers' compensation claims for mental
stress may have increased because of their publicity, the economic
conditions of unemployment, and the increase in tort recoveries for

283. Id. at 850, 851.
284. Id. at 851-53; Swiss Colony, Inc. v. Department of Indus., Labor, & Human Rela·
tions, 240 N.W.2d 128, 130 {WIS. 1976).
285. McGarrah v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp,, 675 P.2d 159, 17()..71 (Or. 1983).
286. ld. at 171; see Troost, supra note 282, at 852-53.
287. For a thorough discus,sion of the causal-nexus test and the compensability of mental
injuries, see Deziel v. Difco Labs., 268 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 1978).
288. ld; see generally lB LARsON, supra note 100, § 42.23(d).
289. See Troost, supra note 282, at 860-65.
290. See DECARLO & MINKowrrz, supra note 277, at 286.
291. See Troost, supra note 282, at 86()..61.
292. See Thamann, supra note 278, at 394. The author, citing NPS Corp. v. Insurance
Co. of N. Am., 511 A.2d 1211 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986), concludes that mental injury is just as real as physical injury and just as capable of being evaluated. ld.
293. DECARLO & MINKowrrz, supra note 277, at 230. Stress claims have more than
doubled between 1980 and 1988. ld. at 279.
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294

intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Because
cases of sexual harassment fit the mental-mental mold, many jurisdictions that recognize mental-mental clahns as compensable deny tort
suits based on sexual harassment. Conversely, jurisdictions that do not
find mental-mental clai1ns compensable are more apt to allow tort
295
After considering the issue,
suits based on sexual harassment.
most employers would probably rather handle mental-mental clailns
through the workers' compensation system than risk large verdicts in
296
tort actions.
The assertion that jurisdictions recognizing mental-mental claitns
must then logically bar tort clahns based on sexual harassment is
erroneous. A rational basis exists for allowing both. Oregon and
Michigan have allowed both claims. In 1983, the Oregon Supreme
Court adopted a two-part objective causation test in recognizing a
mental-mental claitn brought by an employee who was subjected to
297
public reprin1ands and demotion in spite of a high seniority level.
Under the two-part objective causation test, mental-mental clailnants
in Oregon must prove that conditions stressful to an average worker
298
actually existed, and that the employment conditions were the ma299
jor contributing cause of the mental injury. The Oregon legislature
refined the supreme court's objective causation test with a four-part
300
test in 1987.
Notwithstanding Oregon's recognition of mental-mental workers'
compensation claitns, the court of appeals allowed a pharmacy clerk
to bring an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress
against her employer for verbal sexual harassment by her supervisor.301 The court did not analyze her mental-mental claims as being
limited to workers' compensation benefits. In fact, the court held that

294. ld. at 280.
295. 2A LARsoN, supra note 100, § 68.34(d).
296. DECARLO & MINKowrrz, supra note 277. at 230.
297. McGarrah v. State Accident & Ins. Fund Corp., 675 P.2d 159 (Or. 1983).
298. ld. at 171.
299. Id.
300. The Oregon legislature amended its definition of occupational disease to include
mental disorders that meet the following four tests: (1) the stressful employment conditions
must objectively exist; (2) the stressful employment conditions must be different than conditions inherent in every workplace and do not include reasonable personnel actions; (3) the
employee must be diagnosed with a mental or emotional disorder that is generally recognized
in the medical or psychological community; and (4) there must be clear and convincing evidence that the mental disorder arose out of and in the course of employment OR. REv.
STAT. § 656.802(3) (1991).
301. Palmer v. Bi-Mart Co., 758 P.2d 888 (Or. Ct. App. 1988).
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the plaintiffs receipt of workers' compensation benefits based on the
sexually harassing acts did not prevent her common law claim for
302
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Instead of using the
mental-mental nature of her clairn to bar her common law suit under
the exclusive remedy rule, the court found an intentional tort exception because the employer had failed to stop the supervisor's harass303
ment once the employer was notified.
In another com1non law suit based on sexual harassment, in
which the employee was ultbnately assaulted and raped by her supervisor, the court stated that the type of injury does not determine
304
compensability. The court found no causal link between the harassment and a risk of employment because it lacked evidence that
305
the sexual harassment was work-related. The court therefore concluded that the employer was not entitled to su1nmary judgment based
306
on the exclusive remedy provision. However, the court affirmed
sumrnary judgment for the employer because the evidence could not
3111
support the employee's theory of vicarious liability.
Michigan is another state that both recognizes menb)).-mental
workers' compensation claims and allows tort suits based on sex
308
discritnination. The Michigan Supreme Court allowed a tort suit,
which alleged violation of the state Fair Employment Practices
310
Acf&J and the state Civil Rights Act, because these statutes were
intended to promote a public policy distinct from that of workers'
311
compensation. Rather than finding workers' compensation to be
the plaintiff's exclusive remedy, the court allowed both workers' com12
pensation benefits and the tort suif because of the statutes' different purposes. The court found that the purpose of the Workers' Com13
pensation Acf is to assist industrial injury victirns, while the Civil

302. Id. at 890-92.
303. Id. at 892.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Carr v. U.S. West Direct Co., 779 ·p.2d 154, 157 n.S (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
Id. at 156, 157.
/d. at 157.
/d.
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 418.301(2) (West Supp. 1989); Greenwood v. Pontiac

Bd. of Educ., 465 N.W.2d 36~ (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (applying the statutory objective causation test).
309. MICH. COMP. LAws § 423.301 (repealed 1969).
310. Elliott-Larson Civil Rights Act, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 37.2101 (West 198S &
Supp. 1992).
311. Boscaglia v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 362 N.W.2d 642 (Mich. 1984).
312. ld. at 643.
313. MICH. COMP. LAws § 418.131 (Supp. 1990).
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314

Rights Acts address prejudices. The court adopted the Supreme
Court's construction of Title Vll in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
315
Co., holding that one statutory scheme should not be allowed to
316
frustrate the purpose of another statutory scheme.
State civil rights statutes echo Title VII's strong public policy
against racial discritnination and sexual discrimination, which includes
317
sexual harassment. Upholding this public policy, therefore, is a legitimate reason for allowing tort claitns based on sexual harassment
to proceed even though the mental injuries may be compensable
under the state workers' compensation scheme.
The Michigan Court of Appeals further distinguished compensable mental injuries from mental injuries resulting from sexual harass318
ment in Slayton v. Michigan Host, Inc. In Slayton, a fanner waitress was allowed to bring her tort action under the Elliott-Larsen
319
Civil Rights Act, \vhich allows compensatory da1nages for mental
anguish resulting from employment discrimination, in addition to
320
equitable relief. The for1ner waitress alleged that her required unifortn of high-heeled shoes and a short skirt was discriminatory and
321
subjected her to sexual harassment. The waitress and other female
employees had sued the employer in federal court for sexual harass322
ment, and the action had been dismissed without prejudice. The
plaintiff then brought suit in the state court, alleging gender discrimination and harassment because her employer forced her to quit her
323
job in retaliation for her federal suit. The court found that tort law
compensates for personal injury, and that workers' compensation
compensates for disabilities resulting from personal injuries occurring
324
during the course of employment. In other words, although the
court allowed the tort suit, it found that some customary elements of
da1nages in the tort suit may be barred by the exclusive remedy provision.325

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
1985 &
320.
321.
322.
323.

Boscaglia, 362 N.W.2d at 645.
415

u.s. 36, 48 (1974).

Boscaglia, 362 N.W.2d

645, 646.
42 u.s.c. § 2000e (1964) (Supp. n 1970).
332 N.W.2d 498 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
Elliott-T.arsen Civil Rights Act, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 37.2101-.2804 (West
Supp. 1992) (supersedes the Fair Employment Practices Act).
Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act § 37.2803.
Slayton, 332 N.\V.2d at 499.

ld.
ld.
324. ld.
325. /d.

at
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In distinguishing claims for mental suffering because of discrimination from claims for mental injury as the resulting disability, the
court stated that the resulting mental disability would be compensable,
but that the mental suffering does not merge with the resulting mental
326
disability. To explain its decision, the court pointed to the source
327
of the injury. The court stated that mental injuries resulting from
compensable sources should not be confused with mental injuries
328
resulting from sex discrimination. Mental disability caused by general stress in the workplace is compensable, but mental injury based
on sexual discritnination is not compensable because its source is the
"deliberate or inadvertent disregard by the employer of the fundamen329
tal rights of his employees." Because the mental injuries flowing
from the discrimination were independent of any resulting disability
that might be compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, the
330
court allowed the tort suit.
In states with civil rights statutes that do not provide compensatory damages, plaintiffs will need to use conunon law tort claims.
The same policy reasons that the Michigan Court of Appeals used to
allow statute-based sex discri1nination suits support common law tort
suits based on sexual discritnination and sexual harassment.
Florida is one of the few states whose statute addresses the compensability of mental injuries resulting from mental stirnuli. The Florida statute states that "[a] mental or nervous injury due to stress,
fright or excitement only . . . shall be deemed not to be an injury by
331
accident arising out of the employment., Although under its statute Florida finds only mental injuries that result from physical trauma
compensable, the physical trauma requirements have been stretched to
allow compensation for mental injuries caused by a physical trauma
with n1inor physical consequences. In Watson v. Melman, Inc., a
seamstress was accidentally struck behind the ear with a cardboard
331
spool weighing eight and one-half ounces. Although her skin was
only bruised and she was not disabled, she claimed benefits for a
neurosis that developed because the incident reminded her of her son

326. ld.
327. Id.
328. ld.
329. Id. (quoting Freeman v. Kelvinator, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 999. 1000 (E.D. Mich.
1979)).
330. ld.
331. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.02(1) (West 1991).
332. Watson v. Melman. Inc., 106 So. 2d 433, 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958), cert. de·
nied, 111 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1959).
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who had died from a blow to the head. The innocuous blow provided the court with the physical trau1na necessary to make the award
334
for the mental injury. Such strained reasoning would not be necessary if the focus was on the work connection rather than on the type
of trauma that caused the mental injury.
The Florida District Court of Appeals used similar reasoning to
35
bar the tort suits based on sexual harassment in Schwartt and
336
Brown. The batteries or unwanted touchings in these sexual harassment cases did not cause any compensable physical injury, but despite the lack of remedies available under the workers' compensation
statute the court held the statute to be the plaintiffs' exclusive remedy.337 Using the rationale of the court of appeals in Schwartz and
Brown, sexual harassment suits would be barred or allowed depending
on whether physical touching was involved. In Byrd, the Florida
Supreme Court elirninated the possibility of anomalous results by
focusing on the distinct public policies behind workers' compensation
338
laws and sex discrimination laws. Making broader inquiries that
focus on the fundamental policies behind these laws assures more
equitable and consistent treatment of sexual harassment victiJns.
Even though Florida, by statute, does not compensate mental
339
claitns based on sexual harassment, coverage for many physicalmental claitns is, in effect, coverage for mental-mental claims. The
general rule that a jurisdiction that recognizes mental-mental claitns
must logically deny tort suits based on sexual harassment is unfounded because of the strong public policy against sexual harassment and
because sexual harassment is outside the scope of workers' compen340
sation systems. In fact, the Florida District Court of Appeals
found that the Florida Supreme Court made it clear that benefits for
mental-mental clairns and tort suits based on sexual harassment are
341
not mutually exclusive. In Ramada Inn Surfside v. Swanson, a female hotel employee clainted workers' compensation benefits for

333. ld.
334. Jd.
335. Schwartz v. Zippy Mart, Inc., 470 So. 2d 720 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1985), overruled
by Byrd v. Richardson..<Jreensbields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1989).
336. Brown v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 469 So. 2d ISS (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1985),
overruled by Byrd v. Richardson..<Jreenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1989).
337. Schwartz, 470 So. 2d at 724; Brown, 469 So. 2d at 159.
338. Byrd, 552 So. 2d at 1099.
339. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.02(1) (West 1991).
340. Byrd, 552 So. 2d at 1099.
341. Ramada Inn Surfside v. Swanson, 560 So. 2d 300 (Fla. Ct App. 1990).
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unwanted sexual contacts, including intercourse, with her supervisor.342 The court of appeals found that awarding the plaintiff benefits
343
was entirely consistent with Byrd. The court stated that in certain
cases plaintiffs can pursue separate claims for "qualitatively different
344

injuries."
In jurisdictions that bar compensation for mental-mental injuries,

plaintiffs face a diletnma because alleging that physical manifestations
accompany the. emotional injury will strengthen the damages in a tort
suit, but that sarne allegation may cause the tort suit to be barred by
the exclusive remedy rule. Focusing on the nature of the injury causes conflicting court decisions because compensation is granted for
intentional physical injury but not for intentional mental injury. This
focus also results in conflicting decisions regarding the barring of tort
suits under the exclusive remedy rule. When using a nature-of-theinjury test, courts ignore the employer's conduct and allow the employer to use the exclusive remedy provision as a shield to avoid
liability for intentional acts.
lnst~ad of looking at the compensable nature of the injury, Mich-

igan courts look to the theory underlying the proposed civil action to
345
decide whether to allow a civil suit. The Michigan courts have
found that the public policy underlying tort actions brought pursuant
to the state civil rights act were based on a public policy distinct
346
from the policies furthered by the workers' compensation act. The
Florida Supreme Court used the Michigan courts' analysis to look at
the theory or public policy underlying tort suits based on sexual
347
harassment, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Other states should follow Michigan's and Florida's lead and focus
on the conduct of the employer and the theory underlying the claim.
This focus will produce more consistent and equitable results, while
holding intact the general rule of exclusiveness of the workers' compensation remedy.

342. ld.
343. Id. at 304.
344. ld.
345. Boscaglia v. Micbigan Bell Tel. Co., 362 N.W.2d 642 (Mich. 1983); Slayton v.
Michigan Host Inc., 332 N.W.2d 498 (Mich. CL App. 1983).
346. Boscaglia, 362 N.W.2d at 645; Slayton, 332 N.W.2d at 500; Moll v. Parkside
Livonia Credit Union. 525 F.. Supp. 786 (B.D. Mich. 1981); Freeman v. Kelvinator, Inc., 469
F. Supp. 999 (B.D. Mich. 1979).
347. Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099, 1102 (Fla. 1989).
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SEXUAL
SMENT AS OUTSIDE THR SCOPE OF THR
WORKERS' COMPENSATION SCHEME

As shown in the preceding section, courts that rely on the physical or non-physical nature of the injury to deter1nine compensability
348
make conflicting decisions.
In addition, the argument that if mental-mental claitns are compensable, then sexual harassment tort suits
should be barred is unsound because the intentional nature of sexual
harassment and the strong public policy against it place sexual harassment outside the scope of the workers' compensation system.
Workers' compensation schemes are meant to compensate workers
injured by an accident "arising out of' and "in the course'' of employment and caused by a "normal risk or incident" of that employment. Therefore, focusing on the definitions of these tem1s, the conduct of the employer, and the theory underlying the sexual harassment
clahn should lead to more consistent and equitable results.
A.

Sexual Harassment Is Not an Accident

Most states' workers' compensation statutes use the term "accident" to refer to a worker's injury, and this tertn creates interpretation
349
problems for the courts . A popular definition of accident is "an
unlooked for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or
350
designed." Courts look for four elements to detennine whether an
accident occurred: unexpected cause, unexpected result, definite time
351
of the event, and definite tirne of the resulting injury. All these
elements are rarely present, so most courts will find that an accident
352
occurred if its cause was unexpected or its result was unexpected.
This definition of accident is worrisome because courts have
353
used it to find sexual harassment accidental.
Taking the
employee's viewpoint, a court may find that the intentional act of
sexual harassment was accidental because the employee did not ex-

348. See supra notes 232-347 and accompanying text
349. 1A LARsON, supra note 100, § 37.10 (the tenn ..accident" has been adopted in all
but nine states).
350. Id. § 37.00.
351. ld. § 37.20.
352. ld.
353. See, e.g., Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 789 F.2d 540, 545 (7th Cir. 1986); Fields
v.
• Employees Fed. Credit Union, 540 N.B.2d 631, 634-35 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
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354

pect it to occur. However, where there is a pattern of sexual harassment in the workplace, a court should have difficulty fmding that
emotional injury was unexpected by the employee. Additionally, the
intentional nature of sexual harassment renders it an expected cause
355
of injury rather than unexpected. Therefore, sexual harassment is
not an accident and is outside the workers' compensation scheme.
B. Sexual Harassment Does Not Occur During the
Course of Employment
In determining whether the "course" requirement of the compensability test has been met, courts consider the factors of time, place,
356
and activity. Sexual harassment that occurs outside the work period or off the employer's premises does not occur during the course
of employment. The activity factor is less clear cut. Because of the
broad coverage policy of workers' compensation, where employees'
activities such as rescuing or using a different method to complete a
task have benefitted the employer, courts have liberally construed the
357
activity to be during the course of employment. Sexual harassment
activity does not enhance work perfor1nance or benefit the employer
in any way. Moreover, in cases of sexual harassment, analyzing the
employer's activity and motive along with the employee's activity and
motive is also a proper focus in determining whether the course ele•
ment ts met.
Sexual harassment activity is intentional, and the motive is personal. As with other intentional torts, se.xual harassment severs the
employment relationship, and the course requirement cannot be

. 354. Zabkowicz, 789 F.2d at 545
355. See KARON E. PER.KINS-Slmll, INDIANA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FORUM:
HARAsSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE. BSYOND nn.n VII: ADDmONAL CAUSES OF AcnoN AND
REMEDIES IN SEXUAL HARAssMENTS (1992) citing Eddy v. Wickes Corp., No. IP 83-857-C
(S.D. Ind. Nov. 20, 1985).. The court in Eddy found, in an order denying a motion to dismiss, that continuing sexual assaults:
at some point lost their "unexpected, random and single ,occasion" characteristic,
thereby ceasing to become ''accidental" in the meaning of the IWCA • • • • Thus,
once a pattern of abuse had been firmly established, the resultant injuries and
correlative personal injury clajms no longer fell within the Industrial Board's exclusive jurisdiction. but became compensable by this Court.
Id. at 556-51.
356. Professor !..arson states, "An injmy is said to arise in the course of the employment
when it takes place within the period of the employment. at a place where the employee
reasonably may be, and, while he is fulfilling bis duties or engaged in doing something incidental thereto." 1 LARsoN, supra note 100, § 14.00.
357. See generally IA LARsON, supra note 100, §§ 20.()()..29.00.
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358

met. Courts that have looked behind the intentional acts to see if
359
the motivation was work-related have reached inconsistent results.
To refuse to see the intentional act of sexual harassment as occurring
outside the course of employment allo\vs the harassment to continue
and shields employers from taking responsibility for preventing sexual
harassment in the workplace.
C.

Sexual Harassment Does Not Arise out of the Employment

The "arising" element of the compensability test requires that
there be a causal relationship between the injury and the employment.360 Causation exists when the injury arises out of a risk that a
reasonably prudent person would understand as an incident of the
361
employment. Most courts have used the increased risk test to de362
terinine whether the arising element is satisfied. Under the increased risk test, the risk must be incidental to the employment in an
363
amount greater than that faced by the general public. Most jurisdictions hold that assault cases arise out of the employment when, in
the normal friction and strain of the workplace, arguments develop in
3
connection with the work being done. M These types of disputes and
their consequences can be said to be incidents or increased risks of
365
the employment.
Sexual harassment is not an increased risk of employment. Women may be exposed to sexual harassment in public, at home, or at
work. There is no increased risk of sexual harassment on the job.
Sexual harassment is typically the result of purely personal motivations and is usually not related to a dispute about work. A causal
connection between the harassment injury and the employment is

358. 2A LARsON, supra note 100, § 68.11.
359. See, e.g., Alpine Roofing Co. v. Dalton, 539 P.2d 487 (Colo. CL App. 1975) (barring tort suit because assaults by foreman after a work-related dispute and firing was considered work-related and within the course of employment); Smith v. I.annert, 429 S.W.2d 8
(Mo. Ct. App. 1968) (allowing plaintiff to sue in tort for spanking given while taking an
unauthorized rest break because taking the break removed the plaintiff from her scope of
employment). See generally Kawalar, supra note 78, at 190-94 (discussing sexual harassment
in tenns of the workers' compensation compensability test).
360. 1 LARSON, supra note 100, § 6.00.
361. Bowling v. Fountain County Highway Dep'~ 428 N.E.2d 80, 83 (Ind. Ct. App.
1981) (quoting St. Estey Piano Corp. v. Steffe~ 328 N.E.2d 240, 243 (Ind. Ct App. 1975)).
362. 1 LARsON, supra note 100, §§ 6.00, 6.30.
363. Id.
364. Id. § 11.12(b).
365. Id. § 11.00.
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366

tenuous, at best. In applying the increased risk test to cases of
sexual harassment, the courts should find that the harassment did not
367
arise out of the employment.
Injuries caused by sexual harassment do not meet any of the
three tests of compensability: sexual harassment is not an accident, it
does not occur during the course of employment, nor does it arise out
of the employment. Therefore, sexual harassment is outside the scope
of the workers' compensation scheme.
D.

Sexual Harassment Is Outside the Contemplation of the

Workers' Compensation System
The ·right to employment free from sexual harassment is as much
a civil right as is the right to employment free from racial discrimination.368 The California Court of Appeals' fmding in Renteria that
intentional racial harassment is in a "class of civil wrongs outside the
369
contemplation of the workers' compensation system"
applies
370
equally to sexual harassment. As with racial discrimination, sexual
harassment is intolerable in view of the great strides made by the
women's movement and the public policy evidenced in recent federal
and state legislative enactments. The distinct policies behind workers'
compensation statutes and employment discrimination statutes require
that sexual harassment injuries be viewed differently from workers'
371
compensation injuries. To allow sexual harassment injuries to be
366. A minority of jurisdictions use a liberal positional risk test to compensate injuries
resulting from personal risks. Under the positional risk test, the injury arises out of the employment when the employment brings the employee to the zone of danger. This test is
rejected by most jurisdictions as allowing compensation when the work connection is mini·
mal. 1 LARsON, supra note 100_ §6.50; see also B. SMALL. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAW OP INDIANA, § 6.8 at 128·30 (1950).
367. Murphy v. ARA Servs., Inc., 298 S.E.2d 528 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that
sexual harassment by a supervisor during the work day did not arise out of the employment
because the risk was not peculiar to the work and did not arise out of the character of the
position).
368. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e~1 to 2{)()()e-17 (1988).
369. Renteria v. County of Orange, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447, 451 (CL App. 1978).
370. Although the Indiana Court of Appeals for the Fll'St District was willing to find that
racial harassment is an intentional tort meriting an exception to the exclusivity provision, the
Fourth District was not willing -to characterize sexual harassment as an intentional tort. Perry,
604 N.E.2d at 617 (allowing a tort suit based on racial harassment); Fields, 540 N.E.2d at
635 (barring a tort action based on sexual harassment). Instead, the Fourth District held that
sexual harassment was a compensable "accident" Fields, 540 N.B.2d at 635.
371. Freeman v. Kelvinator, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 999, 1000 (B.D. Mich. 1979) (noting that
the goal of workers' compensation is ''to redress 'industrial injuries'," and that the goal of
fair employment laws "is to guarantee equal opportunity in the marketplace • • • ")•
•
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compensable only under the workers; compensation system would not
give effect to the strong public policy against sexual harassment and
other employment discrimination. Workers' compensation benefits do
not provide a si . · cant remedy for sexual harassment because most
harassment injuries will not result in any disability for which benefits
are offered.
Courts that have barred tort suits for sexual harassment have
done so to avoid destroying the historic legislative bargain of giving
up the right to sue in tort in return for a guarantee of compensation
372
regardless of fault. These courts view the right to sue as an essential concession that must be kept intact to preserve the balance of the
373
workers' compensation system. These courts would defer to the
374
legislature for any needed reform.
Because of the difficulty in ascertaining the original legislative
intent behind the workers' compensation systems, which were enacted
between 1910 and 1930, courts need not rigidly impose the original
quid pro quo agreement. Such blind adherence to the original bargain
does not take into account the many changes that have occurred in
society and public policies, including the large-scale pal'ticipation of
women in the workforce and civil rights legislation. Furthermore,
scholars disagree as to the original legislative purposes in enacting
workers' compensation systems. Some scholars believe that the right
to sue at common law was insignificant compared to the protection
75
no-fault compensation would afford to workers? Other scholars believe that employers made the bargain to protect themselves from the
376
likelihood that tort liability would become easier to prove.
The value of the right to sue at comrnon law has substantially
increased since the bargain was struck early in this century. At the
time workers' compensation systems were enacted, the comJnon law
defenses of contributory negligence, assu1nption of risk, and the fel.

.

372. See, e.g., Kofron v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 441 A.2d 226, 231 (Del. 1982) (intentional tort); Burkhart v. Wells Elecs. Corp., 215 N..E.2d 879, 881 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (intentional tort).

373.
374.
375.
sation

See, e.g. , Kofron, 441 A.2d at 231; Burkhart, 215 N.B.2d at 881.
See, e.g., Kofron, 441 A.2d at 231; Burkhart; 215 N.B.2d at 881.
See, e.g., Philips, The Relationship Between the Tort System and Workers' CompenThe True Cost, in CONFBRBNCB ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND WORKPLACE LTA-

Bn.:rN, fmal edited proceedings at 87-88 (1981).
376. See N. AsHFORD, CRISIS IN THE WORKPLACE 389 (1976); see also Note, Exceptions

to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements of Workers' Compensation Statutes, 96 HARV. L. REv.
1641, 1655 (1983).
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low servant rule made the likelihood of success of a tort suit slim.
318
Legal developments such as strict liability for defective products,
379
the easier standard of proof for negligence, elimination of the fel80
381
low servant rule/ and the adoption of comparative negligence
have increased the value of the right to sue at conunon law, rendering the quid pro quo unacceptable in some cases. Therefore, creating
exceptions to the exclusive remedy rule that reflect legal and societal
change is appropriate.
Sexual harassment was probably never contemplated by the original authors of workers' compensation systems because \Vomen did not
have a strong presence in the workplace. Furthermore, public policy
against sexual discrimination had not been formulated and translated
into statutory law. Therefore, sexual harassment is completely outside
the contemplation of the workers' compensation scheme, and employers should not be allowed to use the exclusive remedy provision as a
shield to avoid liability for permitting sexual harassment to occur in
the workplace.
IX. EMPLOYER LIABILI1'Y FOR SEXUAL

If public policy favors eli1ninating sexual harassment from the
workplace, then employers, who are in a position to prevent sexual
harassment, must be held accountable. Usually, victims of workplace
sexual harassment face no difficulty in suing the co-employees responsible.382 Even though victi1ns can bring clahns against co-employees, co-employees may be unable to pay the damages awarded.

377. See supra notes 100-1.06 and accompanying text.
378. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402a (1965) (employers could be held strictly
liable for modifying materials used in the workplace). See generally Note, supra note 376, at
1644-45.
379. Robert H. Ashford & William G. Johnson, Negligence vs. No-Fault liability: An
Analysis of the Workers' Compensation Example, 12 SEroN HALL L. R.Bv. 725, 733-35
(1982) .("[R]ecent plaintiff-oriented developments in tort law have led some commentators to
suggest that the 'compromise' struck by the shared liability of workers• compensation should
be reassessed. These include developments relating to • • • res ipsa loquitor, the rejection of
custom as controlling in detenuining standards of care ••••"). See generally Note, supra
note 376.
380. See Note, supra note 376, at 1645 n.29.
381. For a discussion of the value of the right to sue in tort see Note, supra note 376.
382. Popovich v. lrlando, 811 P.2d 379 (Colo. 1991) (allowing a claim against a co-employee for intentional infliction of emotional distress resulting from sexual harassment, in
addition to workers' compensation benefits); O'Connell v. Chasdi, 511 N.E.2d 349 (Mass.
1987) (allowing claims for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress
against a co-employee).
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Furthem1ore, judgments against co-employees do not deter employers
from pertnitting sexual harassment in the workplace. Unfortunately,
because of the intentional act necessary to bring suit in most states,
many employers are able to insulate themselves from liability for
383
sexual harassment inflicted by their employees.
As with employer liability in Title VII claims, liability in tort
claims is difficult to prove using agency principles. Only when sexual
harassment is seen as being outside the contemplation of the workers'
compensation system and when the employment is seen as providing
the apparent authority or opportunity for sexual harassment to occur
will more courts place liability on employers. Presently, employers are
chiefly found liable because of their own action or inaction when the
possibility of sexual harassment is brought to their attention.
Lawsuits against employers for their own intentional acts are
384
generally allowed as exceptions to the exclusive remedy provision
385
because an intentional act cannot be accidental. However, sexual
harassment is usually carried out by a co-employee, and the majority
of jurisdictions will not allow suits against the employer when neither
386
the employ~r nor its alter-ego comtnitted the sexual barassment.
Courts that do not impose liability on employers for their supervisors'
sexual harassment state that the employers' liability is derivative, and
387
therefore not intentional.
Jurisdictions that must find an intentional tort exception to allow
a suit against the employer have allowed claims of assault and battery
and intentional infliction of emotional distress, but have not allowed
claims of negligent hiring or retention. For example, a federal district
court in New Jersey disallowed a claim against the employer for
negligent hiring, but allowed claitns of battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the satne act of sexual harassment
388
under the statute's exception for intentional wrongs. In Cremen, a

383. Fields v. Cummins Employees Fed. Credit Union, 540 N.E.2d 631 (Ind. Ct. App.
1989) (allowing a claim against a supervisor for sexual harassment and barring a similar suit
against the employer).
384. 2A LARsON, supra note 100. § 68.00.
385. ld.
386. ld. at § 68.21 & n.24.
387. See, e.g., Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 798 (N~D.
DI. 1990) (denying employer liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior); Bailey v.
Unocal Corp., 700 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. m. 1988) (barring suit because any liability of the
employer who did not investigate was only derivative and, therefore, barred by the exclusive
remedy provision). See generally 2A LARsoN, supra note 100, § 68.00.
388. Cremen v. Harrah's Marina Hotel Casino, 680 F. Supp. 150 (D.NJ. 1988).
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supervisor sexually assaulted a casino cocktail server in the
389
supervisor's office at the end of the workday. Although the cocktail server filed a verbal complaint with her employer's affnmative
action officer the day after the assault, she continue,d to be harassed
390
until she got her union involved. After determining that the
employee's injuries resulting from the sexual assault were compensable under the workers' compensation act, the court went on to deter391
mine whether workers' compensation was her exclusive remedy.
Because New Jersey law makes an exception to the exclusive remedy
provision only for intentional wrongs, the plaintiffs claims of negli392
gent hiring and retention were dismissed. The court then proceeded to determine whether the plaintiff's claims of battery and inten393
tional infliction of emotional distress should be allowed.
In making its determination, the federal court applied the substantial certainty test as adopted by the New Jersey Supreme
394
Court. In Millison, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the
legislature could not have intended that employers escape liability for
all willful misconduct falling, short of intentional assault and
395
battery. On the other hand, not wanting the exception for intentional wrongs to swallow the rule, the court, in applying the substantial certainty test, demanded virtual certainty that any complained of
396
hartn had occulTed because of the employer's actions. In. addition
to the substantial certainty test, the New Jersey Supreme Court ·re397
quired that the context of the act be examined. In applying the
context test, the court looked at the resulting injury and the circumstances surrounding it to see if the injury was "a fact of life of industrial employment" or beyond the type of injuries that the legislature
contemplated when enacting workers' compensation as the exclusive
398
remedy for work-related injuries.
Applying the supreme court's two-prong test, the federal district
court agreed with other courts that could not accept sexual harassment

389. Id. at 152.

390. ld.
391. Id. at 155.
392. Id. at 155-56.
.
.
393. ld. at 156-59.
394. Id. at 157 (citing Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 501 A.2d SOS. 514
(NJ. 1985)).
395.. Millison, 501 A.2d at 513•.
396. ld. at 514.
397. It.!.
398. ld.
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399

as "a fact of life of industrial employment., The court pointed out
the importance of the context test by explaining that the quid pro quo
breaks down when a risk that is not inherent in the employment is
400
the cause of the injuries. Following this logic, the court held that
sexual harassment is not the type of injury that the legislature had
contemplated as being limited to the remedy of workers' compensation.401 In addition, the court held that a jury could find that the
plaintiffs sexual assault and harassment rose to the level of intentional wrongs under the substantial certainty test and refused to grant
402
sun1111ary judgment to the employer.
In addition to holding an employer vicariously liable for the
intentional acts of a supervisor, the Arizona Supreme Court has held
an employer directly liable for intentional infliction of emotional
distress when it refused to investigate despite numerous complaints.403 The court found that this conduct was extreme or outrageous as defined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 46,
COIDtnent

(d).4Gt

Because sexual harassment was totally outside the contemplation
of the legislatures in enacting a workers' compensation system, the
rules of that system should have no influence on whether a tort claim
based on sexual harassment is allowed against an employer. Indeed,
the context test used in Cremen indicates that the workers' compensation law should not govern events of sexual harassment in the
workplace. The breakdown of the quid pro quo rationale used by the
court in Cremen to allow intentional tort claims applies with equal
force to negligently pennitted sexual harassment. As part of the original bargain, legislators agreed that consumers should pay the price
necessary to obtain the product they desired. That price included the

399. Cremen, 680 F. Supp. at 159 (citing 'Lui v. Intercontinental Hotels Corp., 634
F. Supp. 684, 686--87 (D. Haw. 1986); Pryor v. United States Gypsum Co., 585 F. Supp.
311, 316 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Bennett v. Purr's Cafeterias, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 887, 890 (D.
Colo. 1982)).
400. Id.
401. ld.
402. ld. at 158-59; accord Palmer v. Bi-Mart Co., 758 P.2d 888 (Or. Cl App. 1988)
(holding that an employer who failed to stop harassment after being notified bad a deliberate
intent to injure the employee).
4t>3.. Ford v.. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 585-86 (Ariz. 1987).
404. Id. at 585. Comment (d) of the Restatement states that there is liability "where the
conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community • • • in which • • • an average member of the community would • • •
exclaim, 'Outrageous!'" REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
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inevitable industrial injuries that would occur in producing the product. However, sexual harassment is not an injury that is necessarily
incurred to produce a consumer product. Therefore, sexual harassment
was not part of the quid pro quo agreement, and employers should
not be allowed to use the exclusive remedy element of the quid pro
quo to avoid their responsibility to rid the \Vorkplace of sexual harassment, even negligently allowed sexual harassment.
When workers' compensation and sexual harassment based claims
are seen as distinct, courts have no problem recognizing tort claims
based on both intent and negligence.40S The tort of negligent hiring
or retention is most successful against employers because it is based
406
on direct liability rather than vicarious Iiability. In negligent hiring
or retention cases, the jury detennines whether the employer knew or
should have known of the sexual harassment and either ignored or
407
otherwise ineffectively dealt with it. Because negligent hiring or
retention clai1ns are based on direct rather than vicarious liability,
whether or not the act of sexual harassment was outside the scope of
the employee's employment is irrelevant..ms Thus, the conunon notion that sexual harassment is virtually never within the scope of
employment does not hatnper finding an employer directly liable.
Besides the rationale that sexual harassment is outside the coverage of the workers' compensation scheme, courts have relie,d on the
•

405.

Seej e"g.~ Murphy

v. ARA Servs.,, 'Inc., 298 S.E.2d 528 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (allowing a tort suit against dte employer for negligent hiring and retention by reasoning that
claims based on sexual harassment are not within the purview of the workers' compensation
act); accord Cox v. Brazo, 303 S.B.2d 71 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983); Kerans v. Porter Paint Co.,
575 N.E.2d ,428 (Ohio 1991).
406. Ford, 734 P.2d at 580; Byrd, 552 So. 2d at 1099; Cox, 303 S.E.2d at 71; Murphy,
298 S.E.2d at 528; Hogan, 340 S.E.2d at 116; Kercw, 575 N.B.2d at 428.
407. The Restatement (Second] of Torts states:
A master is -under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his servant
while acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him from inten-tionally banning others or from so conducting himself as to ,create an unreasonable
.risk of bodily harm to them, if
(a)
the servant
(i)
is upon the premises in possession of tbe master or upon which the servant is privileged to enter only as his setvant, or
(ii)
is using a chattel of the master, and
(b)
the master
(i)
knows or bas reason to know that he has the ability to control his servant, and
(ii)
knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising
such control.
RBSTATEMBNT (SECOND) OP TORTS :§ 317 (1965).
408. ld.
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public policy of Title VII and similar state statutes against sexual
harassment in allowing tort suits against employers based on sexual
409
harassment. Further, these courts have cited with approval the use
410
of agency principles,
1nandated by the Supreme Court in
411
411
Meritor to determine employer liability. Using agency principles to find employers vicariously liable for harassment by their employees in sexual harassment claims based on either statutory or tort
413
law has met with lhnited success. Finding the employer vicariously liable is problematic because under agency principles, the master is liable .only for the servant's torts that are com•nitted within the
414
scope of employment. Many courts decide that the act of sexual
harassment can never benefit the employer and, therefore, the act is
committed outside the scope of employment, and the employer cannot
415
be held liable.
However, employers may be liable for the employees' torts committed outside the scope of their employment under an exception
416
listed in the Restatement (Second) of Agency section 219. Em409. See Byrd v. Ricbardson.Qreenshields Sec•• Inc., SS2 So. 2d 1099, 1102-04 (Fl~
1989); Kerans, 515. N.E.2d at 435.
410. For a detailed discussion of the problems with using agency principles to detennine
employer liability under Title Vll, see Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment liability Under Agency Principles: A Second Look at Meritor Savings Bank, FS:B v. Vinson, 44
VAND. L. REV. 1229 (1991).
411. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
412. Byrd, 552 So. 2d at 1103; Kerans, 515 N.B.2d at 432.
413. See, e.g., Miller v.. Lindenwood Female College, 616 F. Supp. 860 (B.D. Mo. 1985)
(holding that the college was not vicariously liable for the sexually harassing acts of its agent
because the agent was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the act);
Cox v. Brazo, 303 S.E.2d 71, 73 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that a supervisor's harassing
acts were not in furtherance of the employer's business and therefore not within the scope of
employment so as to impose vicarious liability on the employer); Carr v. U S West Direct
Co., 779 P.2d 154 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the employer was not vicariously liable
for tm employee's harassing acts because they were not done within the scope of employment).
414. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1957).
415. See, e.g., Cox, 303 S.E.2d at 73; Ca", 779 P.2d at 157. Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 228 defines tbe scope of employment as follows:
(1)
Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if:
(a) it is of the kind be is employed to perform;
(b)
it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits;
(c)
it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve tbe master, and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of
force is not unexpectable by the master.
(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is differeqt
in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits,
or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master.
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OP AGENCY § 228 (1957).
416. The Restatement (Second) of Agency states:
'

.
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players can be liable for employees' torts committed outside the
scope of their employment if the employer intended the conduct or its
417
consequences, or was negligent or reckless. Although courts hearing tort claims based on sexual harassment have not invoked these
portions of the Restatement, these exceptions support the rationale
courts have used to find employers liable for negligent hiring, negli418
gent retention, and. intentional infliction of emotional distress. In
holding employers vicariously liable under Title Vll, federal courts
have used the exception in section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency to find an employer vicariously liable when an employee is assisted in canying out sexual harassment be,cause of the
employee's authority or apparent authority, or because of the exis..
419
tence of the agency relationsbip. Although courts considering tort
claitns based on sexual harassment have been divided on using the
420
"apparent authority" exception, a general trend in tort law is to
hold employers liable because the employment provided an opportuni421
ty for the tort to occur. This straining under agency principles to
find employers liable for their employees' acts of harassment was
predicted by Justice 'Rehnquist in his Meritor opinion when he recognized that agency principles would not be totally transferable in sexu-

(2)

A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting out-

side the scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct ot the consequences, or
(b)
the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant -purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and
there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1957).
417. Id. § 219(2)(a)-(b).
418. Hart v. National Mortgage & Land Co., 235 Cal. Rptr~ 68 (Ct. App. 19-87); Hogan
v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 340 S.E.2d 116 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986); Palmer v. Bi-Mart Co.,
758 P.2d 888 (Or. Ct. App. 1988).
419. Meritor Sav. B.ank v. Vinson. 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Yates v. Avco Corp., 8'19 F.2d
630 (6th Cir. 1987); Shrout v. Black Claussen Co., 689 F. Supp. 774 (S.D. Ohio 19.88).
420. Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 515 N.E.2d 428, 432 (Ohio 1991) (holding that summary
judgment was improperly granted to the employer). Contra Cox v. Brazo, 303 S.B.2<l 71, 73
(Ga. Ct App. 1983) (denying employer liability based on respondeat superior because the alleged harassment did not further the employer's business); Carr v. U S West Direct Co., 779
P.2d 154, 1S7 (Or. Ct App. 1989) (holding that .summary judgment was correctly granted to
the employer because there were no facts showing that the employment was even remotely
connected to the alleged harassment).
42l. W. PAGB KlmroN ST AL., PROSSBR & KmrroN ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 70, at 507
(Stb ed. 1984).
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422

al harassment cases. Indeed, using agency principles may even
hamper the enforcement of Title Vll and slow the elimination of

sexual harassment from America's workplace.
Courts have someti1nes confused agency principles with the
workers' compensation test for coverage. Some courts have ruled that
it is inconsistent to find a harasser's act to be within the scope of
employment under agency principles, yet to find that the injuries were
not suffered during the course of employment under the workers'
423
compensation system. These courts concl~de that there is an inconsistency because they confuse scope of employment and course of
employment. Although these concepts_ appear to represent s-imilar
tests, the two tests serve entirely different purposes. When detertnining whether an injury occurred during the course of employment,
courts are making inquiry as to the work-connectedness of the injury
to confirm that the injury resulted from a hazard or risk that is inherent in the employment, and therefore, one that the legislature had de-424
signed the workers' compensation system to cover. The scope of
employment test, which is an agency principle, is used to determine
425
when an employer should be liable for the torts of its employee.
Therefore, a finding that sexual harassment did not occur during the
course of employment for workers' compensation purposes, but that
the harassment was comtnitted within the scope of employment according to agency principles is not necessarily inconsistent.
Employers should not be held strictly liable for sexual harassment in the workplace, but public policy and statutory law require
426
that employers use reasonable care to maintain a safe workplace.
When employers know or have reason to know that sexual harassment is occurring in the workplace, they have a duty to undertake a
prompt investigation and effectively e1hninate the harassment or faee
liability for their inaction. Employers are in the best position to pre•

422. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.

423. Sands v. Union Camp Corp., 559 F.2d 1345 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Miller v.
Lindenwood Female College, 616 F. Supp. 860 (B.D. Mo. 1985) (holding that a finding that
injuries sustained during the course of employment for purposes of vicarious liability but not
for workers' compensation coverage was inconsistent).
424. 1 LARsON, supra note 100, § 14.00.
425. RFStATBMENT (SECOND) OP AGENCY § 219 (1) (1957).
426. The purpose of both workers' compensation schemes and the Occupational Safety
and Health Act is to assure that employers will maintain a safe workplace. 29 U.S.C. §
6Sl(b) (1988). See generally Paul Raymond Gurtler, Commenlt The Workers' Compensation
Principle: A Historical Abstract of the Nature of Workers' Compensation, 9
I. PUB.
L & POL'Y 285 (1989).
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vent sexual harassment in the workplace, and therefore the possibility
of employers risking greater liability through tort actions would serve
as an additional deterrent to the currently limited Title VII liability.
The risk of liability should provide employers with the incentive to
take positive steps to prevent sexual harassment. Preventative measures, such as policies against sexual harassment, grievance procedures, and sen1inars, are key to eliminating sexual harassment from
the workplace. Proper use of these policies and procedures, along
with effective employer response to complaints of harassment, will
not only help to eliminate sexual harassment from the workplace, but
will ditninish employer liability.
X. CONCLUSION
Tort claims based on sexual harassment should be allowed as a
means of redressing sexual harassment victims' individual rights. Tort
clailns also serve an important role because they offer some advantages that statutory claims do not. Employers should not be able to
preclude these tort clai1ns by invoking the exclusive remedy provision
of workers' compensation statutes, which were enacted at the tum of
the century to compensate workers for industrial injuries. Using
workers' compensation concepts shifts the focus from the employer's
conduct and the theory underlying the claim to the nature of the
injury, a focus that ignores the strong public policy against sexual
harassment. The public policy against s·exual harassment along with
the intentional nature of sexual harassment places sexual harassment
outside the scope of workers' compensation. Plaintiffs' clai1ns for
sexual harassment should be tried on the merits and not be automatically barred by the workers' compensation system.
Allowing tort claims based on sexual harassment would not
result in strict liability for employers. The agency principles used to
determine employer liability make it difficult to impose liability on
employers for the harassing acts of their employees. However, the
possibility of a tort action would serve as a deterrent and prompt
employers to take steps to prevent sexual harassment, which is the
ultilnate goal.

Courts have reached conflicting results regarding the exclusive
remedy defense because they view their roles in detertttining the
legislative intent underlying workers' compensation statutes differently.
Both the courts and potential plaintiffs need direction from state legislators as to the relationship, if any, between workerst compensation
and sexual harassment. Granted, sexual harassment is a politically
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controversial issue, but it is demanding and receiving attention from
the federal government, labor unions, employers, and the media. The
time has come in the development of sexual harassment law for state
legislators to cl · its relationship to workers' compensation.

